Strategizing For Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance Phase of Inter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative For Victims\u27 Representatives. by Baluarte, David C.
American University International Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 2 Article 3
2012
Strategizing For Compliance: The Evolution of a
Compliance Phase of Inter-American Court
Litigation and the Strategic Imperative For Victims'
Representatives.
David C. Baluarte
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Symposium or Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Baluarte, David C. "Strategizing For Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance Phase of Inter-American Court Litigation and the
Strategic Imperative For Victims' Representatives." American University International Law Review 27 no. 2 (2012): 263-321.
	   	  
	  
263 
STRATEGIZING	  FOR	  COMPLIANCE:	  THE	  EVOLUTION	  OF	  A	  COMPLIANCE	  PHASE	  OF	  INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  COURT	  LITIGATION	  AND	  THE	  STRATEGIC	  IMPERATIVE	  FOR	  VICTIMS’	  REPRESENTATIVES	  DAVID	  C.	  BALUARTE*	  INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................264	  I.	   INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  CASE	  PROCESSING	  FROM	  AN	  IMPLEMENTATION	  PERSPECTIVE	  AND	  THE	  EVOLUTION	  OF	  A	  COMPLIANCE	  PHASE	  OF	  COURT	  LITIGATION ...............269	  A.	   AN	  OVERVIEW	  OF	  IMPLEMENTATION	  IN	  THE	  INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  SYSTEM ...................................................................................................269	  B.	   THE	  EVOLUTION	  OF	  A	  COMPLIANCE	  PHASE	  OF	  INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  COURT	  LITIGATION ...............................................................................275	  II.	   TESTING	  THE	  COURT’S	  COMPLIANCE	  PROCEDURES	  AGAINST	  THE	  PRINCIPAL	  RECOMMENDATIONS	  AND	  CRITIQUES	  OF	  INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  ACTORS................................279	  III.	  SYSTEMATIZING	  COMPLIANCE	  JURISPRUDENCE	  IN	  TERMS	  OF	  REPARATIONS	  TO	  BETTER	  UNDERSTAND	  THE	  IMPLEMENTATION	  OF	  COURT	  DECISIONS ......................287	  IV.	  THE	  ROLE	  OF	  COMPLIANCE	  JURISPRUDENCE	  IN	  FORMULATING	  STRATEGIES	  TO	  COMPEL	  STATES	  TO	  IMPLEMENT	  THE	  COURT’S	  REPARATIONS	  ORDERS.............305	  A.	   APPROACHES	  TO	  MONEY	  DAMAGES	  AND	  SYMBOLIC	  
 	   *	  	   David	   Baluarte	   is	   a	   Practitioner-­‐in-­‐Residence	   in	   the	   International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Clinic	  at	  American	  University	  Washington	  College	  of	  Law.	  	  David	   would	   like	   to	   thank	   the	   clinical	   faculty	   at	   American	   University	  Washington	  College	   of	   Law	   for	   suggestions	   at	   the	   initial	   stage	   of	   this	   article	  and	   express	   his	   appreciation	   to	   Richard	   Wilson,	   Michael	   Camilleri,	   and	  Alexandra	   Huneeus	   for	   comments	   on	   final	   drafts.	   	   He	   would	   also	   like	   to	  recognize	   the	   important	   research	   assistance	   of	   Maria	   Dolores	   Mino	   and	  Charley	  Abbott	  in	  preparing	  this	  article.	  
	   	  
264	   AM.	  U.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	   [27:2	  
REPARATIONS ........................................................................................306	  B.	   CONSIDERATIONS	  FOR	  IMPLEMENTING	  LEGISLATIVE	  REFORMS.....309	  C.	   ANTICIPATING	  BARRIERS	  TO	  JUSTICE .................................................314	  CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................320	  	  INTRODUCTION	  For	   decades,	   international	   law	   and	   relations	   scholars	   have	  debated	  why	   nations	   comply,	  when	   they	   do,	  with	   international	  law.1	  	  Some	  posit	  that	  compliance	  reflects	  rational	  calculations	  of	  national	   interest,	   while	   others	   argue	   that	   compliance	   is	   a	  response	   to	   the	   persuasive	   power	   of	   legal	   obligations.2	  	  International	   lawyers,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   they	   have	   a	  rationalist	   or	   normative	   understanding	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   their	  work,	   generally	   accept	   the	   assertion	   by	   Louis	   Henkin	   that	  “almost	  all	  nations	  observe	  almost	  all	  principles	  of	  international	  law	   and	   almost	   all	   of	   their	   obligations	   almost	   all	   of	   the	   time.”3	  	  The	  assumed	   truth	  of	   this	   assertion	  has	   led	  many	   international	  lawyers	   to	   pursue	   their	   work	   without	   seriously	   evaluating	   its	  real	  impact	  or	  considering	  measures	  to	  make	  it	  more	  meaningful.	  	  As	   Oona	   Hathaway	   has	   aptly	   put	   it,	   “[t]he	   disinclination	   of	  international	   lawyers	   to	   confront	   the	   efficacy	   of	   international	  law	  is	  nowhere	  more	  evident—or	  more	  problematic—than	  in	  the	  field	  of	  human	  rights	  law.”4	  	  	  There	   is,	   however,	   a	   marked	   increase	   in	   concern	   over	   the	  “compliance	   question”	   among	   international	   human	   rights	  
 
	   1.	   See,	  e.g.	  Harold	  Hongju	  Koh,	  Why	  Do	  Nations	  Obey	   International	  Law?,	  106	   YALE	   L.J.	   2599,	   2600	   (1997)	   (noting	   that	   the	   question	   of	   why	   nations	  sometimes	   obey,	   or	   disobey,	   international	   law	   “is	   fundamental	   from	   both	   a	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  perspective”).	  	   2.	   Oona	  A.	  Hathaway,	  Do	  Human	  Rights	  Treaties	  Make	  a	  Difference?,	  111	  YALE	   L.J.	   1935,	   1944-­‐64	   (2002)	   (discussing	   the	   different	   theories	   of	  compliance	   that	   she	   categorizes	   as	   the	   rational	   actor	  models	   and	  normative	  models).	  	   3.	   LOUIS	  HENKIN,	  HOW	  NATIONS	  BEHAVE	  47	  (2d	  ed.	  1979);	  see	  also	  Hathaway,	  
supra	   note	  2,	   at	   1937	   (“This	   assumption	  undergirds	   the	  work	  of	  many	   legal	  scholars	   and	   practitioners,	   who	   endeavor	   to	   explicate	   and	   form	   the	   law	  presumably	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  it	  has	  real	  impact.”).	  	   4.	   Hathaway,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  1938.	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  lawyers,	  who	  are	  “eager	  to	  move	  beyond	  a	  discussion	  about	  why	  nations	   comply	   with	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   to	   a	  discussion	   about	   the	  process	  by	  which	   they	   can	  be	  made	   to	  do	  so.”5	   	   This	   concern	  has	  been	   reflected	   in	   a	   surge	   in	   scholarship	  about	   compliance	   with	   the	   decisions	   of	   regional	   human	   rights	  bodies,6	   fora	  which	  present	  human	  rights	   lawyers	  with	  the	  rare	  opportunity	   to	   bring	   states	   to	   account	   for	   human	   rights	  violations	   perpetrated	   against	   individuals	   and	   communities.	  	  This	   increased	   attention	   to	   the	   topic	   has	   been	   mirrored	   by	  developments	   in	   the	  regional	  human	  rights	  systems	   themselves	  to	  address	  compliance	  deficits	  as	  they	  struggle	  with	  this	  question	  that	  cuts	  to	  the	  core	  of	  their	  legitimacy.7	  In	   the	   inter-­‐American	   human	   rights	   system,	   a	   particularly	  
 	   5.	   Cynthia	   Soohoo	   &	   Suzanne	   Stolz,	   Bringing	   Theories	   of	   Human	   Rights	  
Change	  Home,	  77	  FORDHAM	  L.	  REV.	  459,	  471	  (2008).	  
	   6.	   See,	   e.g.,	   James	   L.	   Cavallaro	   &	   Stephanie	   Erin	   Brewer,	   Reevaluating	  
Regional	  Human	  Rights	  Litigation	  in	  the	  Twenty-­First	  Century:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  
Inter-­American	   Court,	   102	   AM.	   J.	   INT’L	   L.	   768,	   770	   (2008)	   (arguing	   that	   the	  Inter-­‐American	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights’	   most	   effective	   judgments	  incorporated	   respect	   for	   human	   rights	   into	   broader	   domestic	   policies	  affecting	  the	  underlying	   issues);	  Philip	  Leach	  et	  al.,	  Can	  the	  European	  Court’s	  
Pilot	   Judgment	   Procedure	   Help	   Resolve	   Systemic	   Human	   Rights	   Violations?	  Burdov	   and	   the	   Failure	   to	   Implement	   Domestic	   Court	   Decisions	   in	   Russia,	   10	  HUM.	   RTS.	   L.	   REV.	   346,	   346-­‐47,	   350	   (2010)	   (analyzing	   the	   effort	   of	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  to	  address	  some	  systemic	  non-­‐enforcement	  problems	  by	  developing	  the	  pilot	  judgment	  procedure	  in	  2004);	  Frans	  Viljoen	  &	   Lirette	   Louw,	   State	   Compliance	   with	   the	   Recommendations	   of	   the	   African	  
Commission	   on	   Human	   and	   Peoples’	   Rights,	   1994–2004,	   101	   AM.	   J.	   INT’L	   L.	   1	  (2007)	   (discussing	   the	   direct	   effect	   of	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   African	  Commission	   on	   Human	   and	   Peoples’	   Rights	   on	   ensuring	   compliance	   with	  regional	  human	  rights	  treaties).	  
	   7.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Agreement	   of	   Madrid,	   May	   12,	   2009,	   C.E.T.S.	   No.	   194	  (amending	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights	   Article	   46	   to	   permit	  referral	   of	   states	   that	   have	   not	   complied	   with	   judgments	   of	   the	   European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  to	  that	  body	  for	  “infringement	  proceedings”);	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  approved	  November	  28,	  2009,	  art.	  69,	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento/regla_ing.pdf	  [Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Rules	  of	  Procedure]	  (entered	   into	   force	   Jan.	  1,	  2010)	  (amending	  the	  Court’s	  previous	  rules	  to	  create	  a	  procedure	  for	  monitoring	  compliances);	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  of	  the	  African	  Commission	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights,	  
approved	   May	   26,	   2010,	  http://www.achpr.org/english/ROP/Rules%20of%20Procedure.pdf	  (creating	  in	   its	   Rule	   112	   a	   framework	   for	   follow-­‐up	   on	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	  Commission).	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  notable	   development	   is	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	   compliance	   phase	   of	  litigation	  before	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (“the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court”	  or	  “the	  Court”),	  the	  highest	  human	  rights	  court	   in	   the	  Americas.	   	  History	   is	  clear	   that	   the	  open	  refusal	  by	  some	   states	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   Court’s	   reparations	   orders	   led	  the	   tribunal	   to	   take	   the	   unprecedented	   step	   of	   issuing	   public	  orders	   highlighting	   particularly	   troubling	   cases	   of	   non-­‐compliance.	   	   These	   first	   orders	   sparked	   the	   development	   of	   a	  phase	  of	  litigation	  in	  which	  states,	  the	  representatives	  of	  victims,	  and	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights	   (“the	  Inter-­‐American	   Commission”	   or	   “the	   Commission”),	   debate	   the	  adequacy	   of	   measures	   taken	   by	   the	   states	   to	   implement	   the	  reparations	   orders	   of	   the	   Court.	   	   In	   the	   decade	   since	   it	  inaugurated	   this	   practice,	   the	   Court	   has	   issued	   hundreds	   of	  compliance	  orders,	  addressing	   the	   implementation	  processes	   in	  over	  80	  percent	  of	   the	   cases	   in	  which	   it	  has	   issued	   reparations	  decisions,	   with	   multiple	   and	   complex	   orders	   in	   many	   of	   those	  cases.8	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  rapidly	  growing	  body	  of	  jurisprudence	  has	   not	   been	   lost	   on	   those	   engaged	   with	   the	   inter-­‐American	  system.9	   	   International	   relations	   scholars	   have	   seized	   on	   these	  orders	   as	   potential	   windows	   into	   the	   tendencies	   of	   states	   to	  comply	   with	   human	   rights	   obligations10	   and	   human	   rights	  practitioners	  have	  begun	  to	  develop	  an	  empirical	  narrative	  of	  the	  Court’s	   success.11	   	   However,	   despite	   the	   potential	   of	   this	  
 
	   8.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Cavallaro	   &	   Brewer,	   supra	   note	   6,	   at	   784	   (noting	   that	   “88	  percent	  of	  resolved	  contentious	  matters	  [before	  the	  Court]	  were	  in	  the	  phase	  of	  supervision	  of	  compliance	  .	  .	  .”).	  	   9.	   The	   Court	   itself	   lists	   four	   types	   of	   jurisprudence	   on	   its	   webpage,	  including:	  decisions	  and	  judgments;	  advisory	  opinions;	  provisional	  measures;	  and	   compliance	   with	   judgment.	   INTER-­‐AMERICAN	   COURT	   OF	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS,	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/	  (last	  visited	  Mar.	  8,	  2012).	  
	   10.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Courtney	  Hillebrecht,	  Domestic	  Politics,	   International	  Human	  Rights	  Adjudication,	   and	   the	  Problem	  of	  Political	  Will:	   Cases	   from	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Human	   Rights	   System	   (Mar.	   20,	   2009)	   (unpublished	   Ph.D.	  dissertation,	   University	   of	   Wisconsin-­‐Madison)	   (conceptualizing	   compliance	  with	  regional	  human	  rights	  tribunals’	  orders	  as	  a	  “signaling	  game”	   for	  states	  to	  indicate	  their	  commitment	  to	  human	  rights).	  
	   11.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Fernando	   Basch	   et	   al.,	   La	   Efectividad	   del	   Sistema	  
Interamericano	   de	   Protección	   de	   Derechos	   Humanos	   [The	   Effectiveness	   of	   the	  
Inter-­American	  System	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights],	  ASOCIACIÓN	  POR	  LOS	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  compliance	   jurisprudence	   to	   aid	   inter-­‐American	   litigants	   in	  understanding	   the	   viability	   of	   their	   litigation	   initiatives	   and	  improving	   their	   chances	  of	   achieving	   their	  desired	  outcomes,	   it	  has	  been	  underutilized	  for	  this	  purpose.	   	  This	  article	  aims	  to	  fill	  this	  gap,	  and	  provide	  guidance	  for	  those	  willing	  to	  strategize	  for	  compliance.	  This	   article	   provides	   a	   comprehensive	   review	   of	   the	   Court’s	  compliance	   jurisprudence	   by	   developing	   a	   typology	   of	   the	  Court’s	   reparations	   and	   systematizing	   all	   available	   information	  on	   the	   implementation	   of	   those	   reparations.	   	   By	   culling	   more	  than	   90	   experiences	   with	   implementation	   and	   providing	   both	  quantitative	   and	   qualitative	   analysis	   of	   these	   experiences,	   this	  article	   highlights	   the	   predictive	   potential	   of	   this	   body	   of	  jurisprudence.	   	   This	   article	   encourages	   inter-­‐American	  representatives	   to	   inquire	   into	   state	   tendencies	  with	   regard	   to	  compliance	  as	  a	  means	  to	  formulate	  compliance	  strategies	  at	  the	  earliest	   stages	   of	   litigation.	   	   Representatives	   should	   view	   the	  compliance	   phase	   of	   litigation	   like	   any	   other,	   with	   a	   range	   of	  possible	   outcomes	   that	   can	   be	   tactically	   achieved.	   	   In	   this	  way,	  compliance	   jurisprudence	  can	  help	  representatives	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	   potential	   impact	   of	   their	   work,	   and	   to	   take	   deliberate,	  strategic	   steps	   to	   maximize	   that	   impact	   at	   each	   stage	   of	   a	  litigation	  project.	  	  	  The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   article	   will	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   the	  procedure	   under	  which	   contentious	   cases	   are	   processed	   in	   the	  inter-­‐American	   system	   and	   describe	   the	   implementation	  experience	  in	  general	  terms.	  	  It	  will	  then	  trace	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  compliance	   phase	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   litigation,	   reviewing	  both	   its	   historical	   roots	   and	   some	   dynamic	   developments	   from	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  culminating	  in	  the	  Court’s	  newly	  passed	  2010	  Rules	  of	  Procedure.	  	  Following	  this	  description	  of	  the	  compliance	  procedures,	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  article	  places	  the	  compliance	  phase	   of	   Court	   litigation	   into	   the	   context	   of	   the	   debate	   about	  implementation	   in	   the	   inter-­‐American	   system.	   	   This	   section	  synthesizes	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  principal	  observers’	  critiques	  of	  the	  inter-­‐American	  system	  with	  regard	  to	  implementation	  and	  their	  
 DERECHOS	   CIVILES	   (Jan.	   30,	   2012),	   http://www.adc-­‐sidh.org/images/files/adclaefectividaddel	  sidh.pdf.	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  for	   improving	  the	  track	  record	  in	  the	  system,	  and	   specifically	   the	   Court.	   	   The	   second	   part	   concludes	   by	  identifying	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   Court’s	   evolving	   compliance	  proceedings	  respond	  to	  the	  principal	  critiques	  and	  provide	  a	  real	  opportunity	   to	   practitioners	   to	   make	   their	   litigation	   more	  meaningful.	  The	   third	   part	   of	   this	   article	   systematizes	   the	   information	  produced	   in	   the	   compliance	   proceedings	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   a	  framework	   for	   understanding	   the	   likelihood	   of	   achieving	  implementation	  goals.	   	  Specifically,	   it	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	   of	   over	   500	   reparations	   ordered	   in	   91	   reparations	  decisions	  issued	  by	  the	  Court	  between	  1989	  and	  2009	  in	  which	  it	  subsequently	  issued	  compliance	  orders.	  	  This	  analysis	  organizes,	  systematizes,	   and	   codes	   the	   compliance	   orders	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  reparations	   they	   discuss	   and	   provides	   rates	   of	   implementation	  for	  13	  different	  categories	  of	  reparations	  ordered	  by	  the	  Court.12	  	  	  Building	  on	  this	  analysis,	  the	  fourth	  part	  of	  this	  article	  suggests	  that	  these	  fairly	  reliable	  rates	  of	  implementation	  of	  a	  somewhat	  predictable	   range	   of	   remedies	   should	   be	   used	   by	   victims’	  representatives	   to	   counsel	   clients	   in	   an	   informed	   way	   and	   to	  strategize	   for	   compliance	   with	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   decisions.	  	  Specifically,	   the	   fourth	   part	   of	   this	   article	   identifies	   certain	  implementation	  roadblocks	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  monetary	  reparations,	  legislative	  reforms,	  and	  measures	  to	  encourage	  the	  investigation	  and	   prosecution	   of	   perpetrators	   that	   can	   inform	   case-­‐specific	  strategies	  to	  boost	  the	  chances	  that	  states	  will	  implement	  Court-­‐ordered	   reparations.	   	   In	   conclusion,	   this	   article	   encourages	  victims’	   representatives	   to	   incorporate	   this	   knowledge	   of	  compliance	  into	  their	  own	  work	  to	  both	  make	  the	  litigation	  more	  meaningful	   for	   the	   victims	   they	   represent,	   and	   to	   deliver	   them	  the	  best	  results.	  
 	   12.	   Compliance	  orders	  issued	  through	  March	  2011	  were	  reviewed	  as	  part	  of	  this	  study.	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  I.	   INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  CASE	  PROCESSING	  FROM	  AN	  IMPLEMENTATION	  PERSPECTIVE	  AND	  THE	  EVOLUTION	  OF	  A	  COMPLIANCE	  PHASE	  OF	  COURT	  LITIGATION	  Before	   exploring	   the	   compliance	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   the	   representatives	   of	  victims	   and	   survivors	   of	   human	   rights	   abuse,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  contextualize	  that	   inquiry.	   	  Accordingly,	   this	  section	  will	   look	  at	  how	  cases	  are	  processed	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  Court	  and	  look	   at	   the	   rates	   of	   implementation	   of	   the	   decisions	   of	   those	  bodies	   in	   broad	   strokes.	   	   It	   will	   then	   follow	   the	   historical	  development	   of	   the	   compliance	   phase	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	  litigation	  and	  describe	  that	  dynamic	  system	  as	  it	  was	  articulated	  in	  the	  newly	  passed	  2010	  rules	  of	  procedure.	  A.	   AN	  OVERVIEW	  OF	  IMPLEMENTATION	  IN	  THE	  INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  SYSTEM	  While	  this	  article	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court,	   it	   is	  important	   to	   begin	   the	   discussion	   with	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Commission,	   as	   it	   is	   there	   that	   representatives	   must	   litigate	  individual	  petitions	   in	   the	   first	   instance.13	   	  The	  Commission	   is	  a	  quasi-­‐judicial	  human	  rights	  body	  with	  promotional	  functions	  like	  human	   rights	   reporting	   and	   training,	   as	   well	   as	   protective	  functions	   related	   to	   the	   processing	   of	   cases	   alleging	   specific	  violations	   of	   human	   rights.14	   	   As	   to	   the	   latter	   function,	   it	   bears	  emphasis	   that	   the	   Commission	   has	   made	   particular	   strides	   in	  articulating	   its	   individual	   case	   processing	   functions	   in	   recent	  years.	   	   Notably,	   the	   Commission	   is	   empowered	   to	   process	  individual	   complaints	   against	   all	   35	   member	   states	   of	   the	  Organization	  of	  American	   States	   (“OAS”)	   and	  has	   received	  over	  14,000	   such	   petitions	   to	   date.15	   	   It	   received	   1,598	   such	  
 	   13.	   JO	  M.	   PASQUALUCCI,	   THE	   PRACTICE	   AND	   PROCEDURE	   OF	   THE	   INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  COURT	  OF	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  5-­‐7	  (2003).	  	   14.	   Organization	   of	   American	   States,	   American	   Convention	   on	   Human	  Rights	  art.	  41,	  Nov.	  22,	  1969,	  O.A.S.T.S.	  No.	  36,	  1144	  U.N.T.S.	  123	  [hereinafter	  ACHR].	  	   15.	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Comm’n	  H.R.	   [IACHR],	  Annual	  Rep.	   of	   the	   Inter-­Am.	  Comm’n	  
H.R.,	  at	  1-­‐15,	  OEA/Ser.L/V/II	   (Mar.	  7,	  2011)	  [hereinafter	   IACHR	  2010	  Annual	  
Report].	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  complaints	   in	   2010,	   more	   than	   doubling	   the	   658	   received	   in	  2000.16	  	  While	  the	  Commission’s	  growing	  popularity	  has	  strained	  its	   resources	   and	   created	   problems	   in	   case	   processing	   times,	   it	  indicates	   that	   survivors	   of	   human	   rights	   abuse	   in	   the	  Americas	  value	   the	   inter-­‐American	   system	   as	   a	   means	   of	   addressing	  injustice	  that	  they	  have	  suffered	  on	  the	  national	  level.	  The	   individual	   case	   procedure	   established	   by	   the	   American	  Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights	   (“American	  Convention”)	   and	   the	  Commission’s	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  includes	  an	  admissibility	  stage	  and	   a	  merits	   stage.17	   	   At	   any	   point	   during	   this	   proceeding,	   the	  Commission	   may	   preside	   over	   a	   friendly	   settlement	   process	   if	  the	   parties	   so	   request,	   and	   if	   settlement	   discussions	   do	   not	  produce	   the	   results	   desired	   by	   the	   parties,	   the	   Commission	  continues	  to	  process	  the	  case.18	  	  In	  the	  event	  that	  the	  Commission	  finds	  violations	  of	  the	  relevant	  human	  rights	   instruments	  at	  the	  conclusion	   of	   its	   merits	   review,	   it	   will	   prepare	   a	   preliminary	  report	   with	   recommendations	   to	   the	   State	   to	   come	   into	  compliance	  with	  its	  obligations.19	  	  If	  the	  State	  fails	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Commission’s	  recommendations,	   the	  Commission	  may	   issue	  a	   final	  decision	  publicly,20	  or	   in	  those	  cases	   involving	  one	  of	  the	  21	  countries	  that	  have	  ratified	  the	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court,21	  it	  may	  submit	  the	  case	  for	  review	  by	  the	  Court.22	  	  At	  the	  conclusion	   of	   2010,	   the	   Commission	   reported	   that	   1,584	   cases	  were	   pending	   before	   it,	   and	   that	   during	   that	   year	   it	   had	  submitted	   16	   cases	   to	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  
 
	   16.	   Id.	  	   17.	   ACHR,	   supra	   note	   14,	   arts.	   44-­‐47;	   Rules	   of	   Procedure	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  approved	  November	  13,	  2009,	  arts.	  30-­‐37,	  http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/22.RULES%20OF%20PROCEDURE%20IA%20COMMISSION.pdf	  [hereinafter	  IACHR	  Rules	  of	  Procedure].	  
	   18.	   See	   IACHR	  Rules	   of	   Procedure,	   supra	   note	   17,	   art.	   40;	   see	  also	   ACHR,	  
supra	  note	  14,	  arts.	  48,	  50.	  
	   19.	   See	  IACHR	  Rules	  of	  Procedure,	  supra	  note	  17,	  art.	  44.2;	  see	  also	  ACHR,	  
supra	  note	  14,	  art.	  50.	  
	   20.	   See	   IACHR	  Rules	   of	   Procedure,	   supra	   note	   17,	   art.	   47;	   see	  also	   ACHR,	  
supra	  note	  14,	  art.	  51.	  
	   21.	   See	  ACHR,	  supra	  note	  14,	  art.	  62.	  
	   22.	   See	   IACHR	  Rules	   of	   Procedure,	   supra	   note	   17,	   art.	   45;	   see	  also	  ACHR,	  
supra	  note	  14,	  art.	  50.	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  Court.23	  Once	  submitted	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court,	  a	   case	   will	   proceed	   through	   a	   jurisdictional,	   or	   preliminary	  objections	   stage,	   a	   merits	   stage,	   and	   a	   reparations	   and	   costs	  stage.24	   	  Over	  the	  years,	  as	  the	  caseload	  of	  the	  Court	  has	  grown,	  these	  procedures	  have	  become	  more	  streamlined.	  	  Where	  it	  once	  took	   the	   Court	   years	   to	   proceed	   through	   these	   three	   stages	  individually,25	  it	  is	  now	  common	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  resolve	  all	  three	  stages	   of	   litigation	   in	   one	   written	   decision	   published	   after	   a	  single	  public	  hearing.26	  	  A	  decision	  then	  enters	  into	  a	  compliance	  phase,	  the	  procedures	  for	  which	  will	  be	  described	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	   	   By	   the	   end	   of	   2010,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   had	  reached	  final	  dispositions	  in	  126	  contentious	  cases.27	  By	   all	   accounts,	   final	   decisions	   by	   both	   the	   Commission	   and	  Court	   are	   generally	   received	   unenthusiastically	   by	   states,	   and	  efforts	   to	   comply	   are	   generally	   slow	   if	   they	   exist	   at	   all.	   	   The	  Commission	  published	   implementation	  data	   in	   its	   2010	  Annual	  Report	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  142	  cases	  that	  it	  had	  resolved	  through	  friendly	   settlement	   agreement	   or	   final	   merits	   decision	   since	  
 
	   23.	   IACHR	  2010	  Annual	  Report,	  supra	  note	  15.	  	   24.	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Rules	  of	  Procedure,	  supra	  note	  7,	  arts.	  35-­‐69.	  
	   25.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Velásquez	   Rodríguez	   v.	   Honduras,	   Preliminary	   Objections,	  Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   1	   (Jun.	   26,	   1987)	   [hereinafter	  Velásquez	  Rodríguez,	  Preliminary	  Objections]	  (ruling	  on	  only	  the	  preliminary	  objections	  of	  the	  state	  and	  noting	  that	  the	  Court	  would	  follow	  with	  a	  hearing	  on	  the	  merits);	  Velásquez	  Rodriguez	  v.	  Honduras,	  Merits,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  1	  (Jul.	  29,	  1988)	  [hereinafter	  Velásquez	  Rodríguez,	  Merits]	  (ruling	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  case	  after	  a	  hearing	  before	  the	  Court);	  Velásquez	  Rodríguez	   v.	   Honduras,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	  (ser.	   C)	  No.	   1	   (Jul.	   21,	   1989)	   [hereinafter	   Velásquez	  Rodríguez	   v.	   Honduras,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs]	  (declaring	  the	  reparations	  and	  costs	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  case).	  
	   26.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Humberto	   Sánchez	   v.	   Honduras,	   Preliminary	   Objections,	  Merits,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   99	  (Jun.	   7,	   2003)	   (combining	   multiple	   phases	   of	   the	   case	   into	   one	   written	  judgment).	   There	   does	   exist	   the	   possibility,	   albeit	   rare,	   that	   the	   Court	   will	  decide	   a	   case	   without	   first	   holding	   a	   public	   hearing.	   	   See	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	  Rules	  of	  Procedure,	  supra	  note	  7,	  art.	  15.1	  (contemplating	  this	  possibility).	  
	   27.	   See	  Decisions	   and	   Judgments,	   INTER-­‐AMERICAN	   COURT	   OF	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS,	  www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm	   (last	   visited	   Mar.	   8,	   2012)	   (listing	   the	  jurisprudence	   of	   the	   Court	   regarding	   contentious	   cases,	   including	   the	   final	  disposition	  of	  numerous	  cases).	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  2000,	  when	   it	   first	   started	   collecting	   such	   data.28	   	   According	   to	  that	  data,	  states	  have	  fully	  complied	  with	  recommendations	  in	  15	  percent	  of	  its	  cases,	  taken	  some	  steps	  towards	  compliance	  in	  65	  percent	   of	   its	   cases,	   and	   refused	   to	   comply	   with	   any	  recommendations	   in	   20	   percent	   of	   its	   cases.29	   	   This	   can	   be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  with	  respect	  to	  compliance	  in	  its	  annual	  reports.	  	  Between	  1989,	  when	   the	   Court	   issued	   its	   first	   reparations	   decision,	   and	  2009,	  the	  Court	  had	  issued	  a	  total	  of	  115	  reparations	  decisions	  in	  contentious	   cases.30	   	   In	   its	   2010	  Annual	  Report	   to	   the	  OAS,	   the	  Court	   reported	   that	   it	   was	  monitoring	   compliance	  with	   102	   of	  the	  115	  reparations	  decisions	  it	  had	  issued	  by	  the	  close	  of	  2009,	  which	   translates	   into	   a	   rate	   of	   full	   compliance	   of	   just	   over	   11	  percent.31	  	  	  While	  the	  rates	  of	  full	  compliance	  before	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  Court	  would	  appear	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  each	  of	  these	   bodies	   is	   similar,	   a	   more	   nuanced	   approach	   provides	   a	  more	  accurate	  picture.	  	  For	  example,	  some	  observers	  have	  begun	  to	  explore	  cases	  of	  partial	  compliance	  in	  more	  detail	  and	  review	  which	   parts	   of	   the	   remedial	   orders	   of	   the	   bodies	   are	  implemented	  by	  states.	  	  One	  study	  reviewed	  the	  implementation	  of	  462	  separate	  remedies	  recommended	  in	  final	  merits	  decisions	  and	   friendly	   settlement	   agreements	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Commission	   and	   ordered	   in	   reparations	   decisions	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	  between	  2001	  and	  2006.32	   	  The	  study	  found	  an	  
 
	   28.	   IACHR	  2010	  Annual	  Report,	  supra	  note	  15,	  ch.	  3	  (describing	  the	  status	  of	   compliance	  with	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	   IACHR	   in	   cases	   from	  2000-­‐2010).	  
	   29.	   Id.	  at	  67-­‐74.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  reported	  that	  of	   the	   143	   friendly	   settlement	   agreements	   and	   final	  merits	   decisions	   it	   had	  issued	  since	  2000,	  22	  (or	  15	  percent)	  had	  reached	  “full	  compliance,”	  28	  (or	  20	  percent)	  were	  “pending	  compliance,”	  and	  93	  (or	  65	  percent)	  were	  in	  a	  state	  of	  “partial	  compliance.”	  Id.	  
	   30.	   See	  Decisions	   and	   Judgments,	   supra	   note	   27	   (listing	   all	   of	   the	   Court’s	  decisions	   and	   judgments	   in	   contentious	   cases,	   including	   those	   with	  reparations).	  	   31.	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.,	  Annual	   Rep.	   of	   the	   Inter-­American	   Court	   of	   Human	  
Rights:	   2010,	   at	   79-­‐82	   (2011).	   	   Moreover,	   as	   of	   the	   date	   of	   this	   writing,	   no	  other	   case	   has	   been	   closed	   as	   a	   result	   of	   full	   compliance.	   See	  Decisions	   and	  
Judgments,	  supra	  note	  27.	  
	   32.	   See	  Basch	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  11,	  §	  III.3.	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  11	   percent	   rate	   of	   full	   observance	   with	   specific	   remedies	  recommended	  by	   the	  Commission,	  an	  18	  percent	  rate	  of	  partial	  observance,	   and	   an	   unfortunate	   71	   percent	   rate	   of	   non-­‐observance	   with	   recommendations	   in	   final	   merits	   decisions.33	  	  Looking	   then	  at	   the	  Court,	   the	  study	   found	  a	  29	  percent	  rate	  of	  total	  observance	  with	  the	  different	  types	  of	  remedies	  ordered,	  a	  12	  percent	   rate	   of	   partial	   observance,	   and	   a	   59	  percent	   rate	   of	  non-­‐observance.34	   	   These	   numbers	   indicate	   that,	   as	   a	   general	  matter,	   states	   tend	   to	   comply	   with	   more	   of	   the	   reparations	  ordered	   by	   the	   Court	   than	   those	   recommended	   by	   the	  Commission.	  One	  explanation	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  rates	  of	   implementation	  of	   the	   decisions	   of	   these	   two	  bodies	   is	   the	   common	  perception	  that	  the	  Commission	  issues	  non-­‐binding	  recommendations	  while	  the	  Court’s	  judgments	  are	  legally	  binding.	  	  While	  the	  Court	  itself	  has	   found	   that	   states	   have	   the	   obligation	   to	   comply	   with	   the	  recommendations	   of	   the	   Commission	   in	   good	   faith,	   it	   has	   also	  recognized	   that	   interpreted	   the	   word	   “recommendation”	   to	  conform	  to	  its	  ordinary	  meaning35	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  Court,	  the	  American	   Convention	   provides	   that	   its	   decisions	   are	   “final	   and	  not	   subject	   to	   appeal,”	   and	   while	   parties	   can	   request	   that	   the	  Court	   clarify	   the	   scope	   or	   meaning	   of	   its	   decision,	   once	   such	  clarification	  has	  been	  provided,	  “States	  Parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  undertake	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	   Court.”36	  	  Moreover,	  the	  21	  states	  subject	  to	  these	  binding	  provisions	  have	  taken	   on	   those	   obligations	   through	   a	   separate	   process	   of	  ratification,	   which	   likely	   indicates	   more	   engagement	   with	   the	  inter-­‐American	   process	   generally.37	   	   In	   that	   sense,	   the	   states	  
 
	   33.	   See	  id.	  
	   34.	   Id.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   higher	   level	   of	   implementation	   of	   remedies	  agreed	  to	  in	  friendly	  settlement	  procedures,	  which	  the	  previously	  cited	  study	  found	  to	  have	  a	  54	  percent	  rate	  of	  observance,	  and	  corresponding	  16	  percent	  and	  30	  percent	  rates	  of	  partial	  observance	  and	  non-­‐observance.	  	  Id.	  §	  III.4.	  
	   35.	   See	  Loayza	  Tamayo	  v.	  Peru,	  Merits,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  33	  (Sep.	  17,	  1997),	  ¶¶	  79-­‐80.	  
	   36.	   ACHR,	  supra	  note	  14,	  arts.	  67-­‐68.	  
	   37.	   ACHR,	   supra	  note	  14,	  art.	  62	   (signatories	  of	   the	  American	  Convention	  “may,	   upon	   depositing	   its	   instrument	   of	   ratification	   or	   adherence	   to	   th[e]	  Convention,	  or	  at	  any	  subsequent	  time,	  declare	  that	   it	  recognizes	  as	  binding,	  ipso	   facto,	  and	  not	   requiring	  special	  agreement,	   the	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	  Court	  on	   all	   matters	   relating	   to	   the	   interpretation	   or	   application	   of	   th[e]	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  themselves	   have	   manifested	   with	   greater	   seriousness	   their	  willingness	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   adjudicatory	   process,	   and	  therefore	   may	   be	   more	   inclined	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   ordered	  outcome.38	  	  	  Further,	   there	   is	   a	   fairly	   substantial	   difference	   between	   the	  levels	   of	   detail	   and	   specificity	   with	   which	   the	   Court	   and	  Commission	   approach	   reparations.	   	   Where	   the	   Court	   takes	  arguments	  from	  the	  parties	  on	  reparations	  and	  issues	  a	  reasoned	  reparations	   decision,39	   the	   Commission	   moves	   more	   quickly	  between	  finding	  a	  violation	  and	  articulating	  remedial	  steps	  that	  should	  be	  taken.40	  	  Similarly,	  the	  reparations	  orders	  of	  the	  Court	  tend	   to	   be	   fairly	   specific	   while	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	  Commission	  can	  be	  quite	  vague.	  	  This	  greater	  level	  of	  specificity	  in	   the	   reparations	   ordered	   by	   the	   Court	   reflects	   more	   specific	  expectations	   and	   creates	   a	   clearer	   framework	   for	   follow-­‐up.	  	  Moreover,	   the	   Court	   has	   engaged	   in	   a	   serious	   process	   over	   the	  last	   decade	   to	   develop	   procedures	   for	   compliance	   supervision,	  where	   the	   Commission	   has	   largely	   limited	   its	   compliance	  activities	  to	  annual	  reporting.41	  	  	  
 Convention.”).	  	   38.	   Of	  course,	  state	  interests	  often	  change	  when	  governments	  change	  and	  the	  level	  of	  engagement	  with	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  system	  is	  subject	  to	  change	  just	   like	  any	  other	  political	  platform;	   take	   for	  example	  Peru	  under	  President	  Alberto	   Fujimori.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Castillo	   Petruzzi	   et	   al.	   v.	   Peru,	   Preliminary	  Objections,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   41,	   ¶¶	   99-­‐104	   (Sept.	   4,	   1998)	  (overruling	  Peru’s	  preliminary	  objections	   that	   “the	   sovereign	  decision	   .	   .	   .	   of	  Peru	   cannot	   be	   modified	   much	   less	   rendered	   ineffective	   by	   any	   .	   .	   .	  international	  authority”).	  
	   39.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Gomes	   Lund	   et	   al.	   v.	   Brazil,	   Preliminary	   Objections,	   Merits,	  Reparations,	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  219,	  ¶¶	  245-­‐324	  (Nov.	  24,	  2010)	  (discussing	  in	  detail	  the	  obligations	  of	  Brazil	  arising	  out	  of	   the	  Court’s	   findings	   in	   this	   case,	   including	   summaries	  of	   arguments	  made	  by	  the	  state	  and	  the	  victims’	  representatives	  on	  each	  matter).	  
	   40.	   See,	   e.g.,	   de	   Oliveira	   v.	   Brazil,	   Case	   12.308,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Comm’n	   H.R.,	  Report	   No.	   37/10,	   ¶¶	   151-­‐59	   (2010),	  http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/	   merits.asp	   (assessing	   the	  allegations	   against	   Brazil,	   finding	   it	   violated	   the	   American	   Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  promptly	  issuing	  recommendations	  for	  reparations	  to	  the	  victim’s	  family).	  
	   41.	   See	   OPEN	   SOC’Y	   JUSTICE	   INITIATIVE,	   FROM	   JUDGMENT	   TO	   JUSTICE:	  IMPLEMENTING	   INTERNATIONAL	   AND	   REGIONAL	   HUMAN	   RIGHTS	   DECISIONS	   77-­‐88	  (2010)	  (describing	  in	  detail	  the	  compliance	  reports	  from	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  number	  of	  new	  compliance	  mechanisms	  developed	  by	  the	  Court	  over	  the	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  B.	   THE	  EVOLUTION	  OF	  A	  COMPLIANCE	  PHASE	  OF	  INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  COURT	  LITIGATION	  	  When	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   issued	   its	   first	   reparations	  orders	   in	   1989	   against	   Honduras,42	   it	   took	   affirmative	   steps	   to	  outline	   a	   framework	   for	   monitoring	   compliance	   with	   those	  orders.	   	   In	   both	   Velásquez	   Rodriguez	   v.	   Honduras	   and	   Godínez	  
Cruz	   v.	   Honduras,	   in	   which	   the	   Court	   condemned	   a	   systematic	  practice	  of	  forced	  disappearance	  in	  Honduras,	  the	  Court	  ordered	  “just	  compensation”	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  families	  of	  the	  victims,	  and	  detailed	   the	   exact	   amounts	   to	   be	   paid	   and	   specified	   the	   “form	  and	   amount	   of	   such	   compensation.”43	   	   It	   is	   significant	   that	   this	  was	  the	  only	  remedy	  mentioned	  in	  the	  operational	  portion	  of	  the	  Court’s	  reparations	  orders,	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  which	  it	  provided	  that	   it	   would	   “supervise	   the	   indemnification	   ordered	   and	  .	  .	  .	  close	  the	  file	  only	  when	  the	  compensation	  has	  been	  paid.”44	  	  The	  Court	  closed	  both	  of	   the	  these	  cases	  when	  Honduras	  completed	  payment	   to	   the	  victims’	   families	   in	  1996,	  an	  act	   finalized	  under	  president	   Roberto	   Reina,	   former	   Judge	   for	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court.	  45	  	  	  The	  Court	  also	  explicitly	   tied	   its	   compliance	   functions	   largely	  to	   payment	   of	   pecuniary	   damages	   in	   the	   next	   two	   reparations	  orders	   in	   Aloeboetoe	   et	   al.	   v.	   Suriname–a	   case	   involving	   seven	  members	  of	  a	  Maroon	  ethnic	  community	  that	  had	  been	  killed	  by	  members	  of	   the	  military,46	  and	  Gangaram-­Panday	  v.	  Suriname–a	  
 last	  decade).	  	   42.	   Velásquez	   Rodríguez	   v.	   Honduras,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	   supra	   note	  25;	   see	   also	   Godínez	   Cruz	   v.	   Honduras,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	   Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  8	  (Jul	  21,	  1989)	  [hereinafter	  Godínez	  Cruz].	  	   43.	   Velásquez	  Rodríguez,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  supra	  note	  25,	  ¶¶	  1-­‐6;	  see	  
also	  Godínez	  Cruz,	  supra	  note	  42.	  	   44.	   Velásquez	  Rodríguez,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	   supra	   note	  25,	  ¶	  60;	   see	  
also	  Godínez	  Cruz,	  supra	  note	  42,	  ¶	  54.	  
	   45.	   See	   Cavallaro	   &	   Brewer,	   supra	   note	   6,	   at	   791	   (describing	   how	  supranational	   litigation	   can	   support	   human	   rights	   advocacy	   by	   certain	  governmental	  actors).	  	   46.	   Aloeboetoe	  et	  al.	  v.	  Suriname,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  15,	  ¶	  96	  (Sep.	  10,	  1993)	  (requiring	  the	  government	  to	  reopen	  and	  staff	  a	  school	  as	  part	  of	  the	  damages	  awarded	  to	  the	  victims).	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  case	   of	   a	   man	   who	   had	   died	   in	   military	   detention,47	   issued	   in	  1993	   and	   1994	   respectively.	   	   In	   1996,	   however,	   the	   same	   year	  that	   the	   Court	   closed	   the	   Honduran	   cases,	   the	   Court	   explicitly	  ordered	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   operative	   portion	   of	   its	  reparations	  decision	  in	  El	  Amparo	  v.	  Venezuela	  that	  “the	  State	  of	  Venezuela	   shall	   be	   obliged	   to	   continue	   investigations	   into	   the	  events	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   instant	   case,	   and	   to	   punish	   those	  responsible,”	  and	   indicated	  that	   it	  would	  “supervise	  compliance	  with	  this	  Judgment	  and	  that	  only	  when	  it	  has	  been	  executed	  will	  the	  case	  be	  considered	  closed.”48	  	  	  This	  was	   the	   first	   time	   that	   the	  Court	  made	  closure	  of	   a	   case	  contingent	  on	   a	   completed	   investigation	  of	   human	   rights	   abuse	  and	  prosecution	  of	   those	   responsible.	  Notably,	   the	  Court	   is	   still	  monitoring	  compliance	  in	  El	  Amparo,49	  as	  it	  is	  in	  every	  decision	  it	  has	   since	   issued	   in	   which	   it	   has	   required	   investigation,	  prosecution	  and	  punishment	  of	  perpetrators.	  As	   the	   compliance	   challenge	   became	   clearer	   to	   the	   Court,	   it	  took	  more	  deliberate	  steps	  to	  address	  state	  reticence.	  	  In	  the	  late	  1990s,	  when	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Court	  changed	  and	  the	  new	  judges	  demonstrated	  a	  more	  progressive	  and	  nuanced	  approach	  to	   reparations,50	   the	   need	   to	   be	   more	   comprehensive	   in	  monitoring	   compliance	   became	   even	   more	   important.	  	  Specifically,	   during	   these	   years,	   President	   Alberto	   Fujimori	   of	  Peru	  began	  to	  openly	  contest	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court,	  refusing	  to	  implement	  numerous	  reparations	  orders.51	  	  It	   is	   likely	   no	   coincidence	   that	   when	   Fujimori	   attempted	   to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  contentious	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  in	  1999,	  arguing	   that	   the	   Court	  was	   interfering	  with	   the	   State’s	   right	   to	  control	  a	  terrorist	  threat,	  the	  Court	  took	  the	  unprecedented	  step	  
 	   47.	   Gangaram	   Panday	   v.	   Suriname,	   Merits,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  16,	  ¶	  69-­‐71	  (Jan.	  21,	  1994).	  	   48.	   El	   Amparo	   v.	   Venezuela,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  28,	  ¶	  64	  (Sep.	  14,	  1996).	  
	   49.	   See	   El	   Amparo	   v.	   Venezuela,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (July	  4,	  2006);	  see	  also	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.,	  
Annual	  Rep.	  of	  the	  Inter-­Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.:	  2008	  (2009).	  
	   50.	   See	   generally	   Thomas	   M.	   Antkowiak,	   Remedial	   Approaches	   to	   Human	  
Rights	   Violations:	   The	   Inter-­American	   Court	   of	  Human	  Rights	   and	  Beyond,	   46	  COLUM.	  J.	  TRANSNAT’L	  L.	  351	  (2008).	  
	   51.	   See	  Cacado	  Trinidade,	  Jornadas	  de	  Derecho	  Internacional	  (2006).	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  of	   issuing	   its	   first	  ever	  compliance	  orders.52	   	   In	  2001,	   the	  Court	  took	   the	   additional	   steps	   of	   including	   in	   the	   reparations	  decisions	  issued	  in	  Barrios-­Altos	  v.	  Peru	  and	  Durand	  and	  Uguarte	  
v.	   Peru	   orders	   that	   Peru	   present	   a	   report	   on	   compliance	   to	   the	  Court	   within	   six	   months	   of	   the	   date	   that	   the	   decision	   was	  issued.53	   	   In	   Cantoral	   Benavides	   v.	   Peru,	   the	   Court	   went	   a	   step	  further	   and	   required	   a	   report	   “every	   six	  months”	   following	   the	  decision.54	  	  	  These	   new	   procedures,	   which	   the	   Court	   appears	   to	   have	  initially	   developed	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   Fujimori	   regime’s	   non-­‐compliance,	  soon	  became	  standard	  practice.	  	  By	  2002,	  the	  Court	  had	   begun	   to	   attach	   timetables	   to	   the	   specific	   aspects	   of	   its	  reparations	  decisions,	  which	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  clearly	  establishing	  its	   expectations	   for	   when	   the	   state	   should	   pay	   pecuniary	  damages,	   issue	   public	   apologies,	   or	   complete	   legislative	   and	  administrative	  reforms	  to	  guarantee	  non-­‐repetition.55	   	  In	  almost	  every	   decision	   since	   issued,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   has	  incorporated	   a	   reporting	   requirement,	   though	   it	   has	   fluctuated	  between	  six	  months	  and	  one	  year	  in	  2002	  and	  2003,	  one	  year	  in	  2004	  and	  2005,	  one	  year	  and	  18	  months	  in	  2006	  and	  2007,	  and	  six	  months	  and	  one	  year	  in	  2008	  and	  2009.56	  The	  Court	  continued	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  its	  compliance	  
 	   52.	   CENTRO	   POR	   LA	   JUSTICIA	   Y	   EL	   DERECHO	   INTERNACIONAL	   [CEJIL],	  IMPLEMENTACIÓN	   DE	   LAS	   DECISIONES	   DEL	   SISTEMA	   INTERAMERICANO	   DE	   DERECHOS	  HUMANOS:	   JURISPRUDENCIA,	   NORMATIVA	   Y	   EXPERIENCIAS	   NACIONALES	  [IMPLEMENTATION	  OF	  THE	  DECISIONS	  OF	  THE	  INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  SYSTEM:	  LAW,	   LEGISLATION	   AND	   NATIONAL	   EXPERIENCES]	   32	   n.73	   (Viviana	   Krsticevic	   &	  Liliana	   Tojo	   eds.,	   2007)	   [hereinafter	   CEJIL	   IMPLEMENTATION	   I]	   (citing	  specifically	  Resolutions	  on	  Compliance	   in	  Castillo	  Partruzzi	  et	  al.	   and	  Loyaza	  
Tamayo).	  	   53.	   Barrios	   Altos	   v.	   Peru,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	  H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   87,	   ¶	   50	   (Nov.	   30,	   2001);	   Durand	   &	   Ugarte	   v.	   Peru,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  89,	  ¶	  45	  (Dec.	  3,	  2001).	  	   54.	   Cantoral	  Benavides	  v.	  Peru,	  Merits,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  88,	  ¶	  99	  (Dec.	  3,	  2001).	  	   55.	   Bámaca-­‐Velásquez	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	   Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  91,	  ¶¶	  96-­‐105	  (Feb.	  22,	  2002).	  	   56.	   Notably,	  while	  the	  timetables	  associated	  with	  specific	  reparations	  have	  become	  increasingly	  specific	  over	  time,	  in	  recent	  years,	  the	  Court	  has	  become	  less	   consistent	   in	   establishing	   timetables	   for	   State	   compliance	   reporting,	  actually	  declining	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  handful	  of	  recent	  decisions.	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  procedures	   with	   a	   2005	   Resolution	   entitled	   “Supervision	   of	  Compliance	   with	   Sentences	   (Applicability	   of	   Article	   65	   of	   the	  American	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights).”57	   	   The	   Resolution	  indicated	   that	   the	   Court	   will	   make	   a	   final	   determination	   with	  regard	  to	  compliance	  after	  the	  prescribed	  time	  periods	  indicated	  in	  the	  judgment	  lapses,	  and	  then	  report	  that	  case	  to	  the	  OAS	  in	  its	  annual	   report	   until	   such	   time	   as	   the	   state	   demonstrates	  implementation	  of	   all	   reparations	  ordered.58	   	   In	   the	  Resolution,	  the	   Court	   retains	   its	   ability	   to	   require	   reporting	   about	  compliance	  whenever	  it	  deems	  such	  reporting	  necessary.59	  	  Since	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  2005	  Resolution,	  the	  Court	  has	  progressively	  developed	  its	  compliance	  practices.	  In	   2008,	   the	   Court	   convened	   its	   first	   compliance	   hearings	   to	  provide	  the	  parties	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  present	  their	  evidence	  and	  arguments	  orally.60	  	  The	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  OAS	  issued	  a	   Resolution	   in	   2009	   “recognizing	   the	   important	   and	  constructive	   practice	   begun	   by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   of	  Human	   Rights	   to	   hold	   closed	   hearings	   on	   the	   monitoring	   of	  compliance	   with	   its	   judgments,	   and	   the	   outcomes	   thereof.”	   61	  	  Just	   as	   the	  practice	  of	   closed	  hearings	  with	  one	   to	   three	   judges	  became	   institutionalized,	   the	   Court	   again	   began	   to	   innovate,	  creating	   opportunities	   for	   public	   hearings,62	   and	   hearings	   on	  multiple	   cases	   involving	   one	   country	   and	   a	   similar	   type	   of	  reparations	  order.63	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  particular	  component	  of	  
 	   57.	   Aplicabilidad	   del	   Artículo	   65	   de	   la	   Convención	   Americana	   sobre	  Derechos	  Humanos	  [Applicability	  of	  Article	  65	  of	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	   Rights],	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court,	  Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   June	   29,	   2005),	   available	   at	  www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/	  supervisiones/general_29_06_05.pdf.	  
	   58.	   Id.	  ¶	  9.	  
	   59.	   See	  CEJIL	  IMPLEMENTATION	  I,	  	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  33.	  	   60.	   Interview	  with	  Francisco	  Quintana,	  Deputy	  Program	  Director,	  Andean,	  North	  America	  &	  Caribbean	  Region,	  CEJIL,	  in	  Washington,	  D.C.	  (Dec.	  2009).	  
	   61.	   See	  IACHR,	  Observations	  and	  Recommendations	  on	  the	  Annual	  Report	  of	  
the	   Inter-­American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  AG/RES.	  2500	  (XXXIX-­‐O/09)	  (Jun.	  4,	  2009)	  [hereinafter	  Observations	  and	  Recommendations].	  
	   62.	   See	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.,	  Annual	  Rep.	  of	  the	  Inter-­Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  2009,	  at	  65	  (2010).	  	   63.	   IACtHR,	   Resolution	   April	   29,	   2010,	   available	   at	  www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/8casos_29_04_10.pdf	  (convening	  a	  hearing	  in	  eight	  Colombian	  cases	  simultaneously	  to	  hear	  submissions	  from	  the	  parties	  on	   the	   state’s	   implementation	   of	   the	   Court’s	   orders	   to	   provide	  medical	   and	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  the	   compliance	   supervision	   procedures	   of	   the	   Court	   has	   only	  begun	  to	  evolve,	  and	  if	  history	  is	  any	  indicator,	  this	  is	  likely	  just	  the	  newest	  facet	  of	  a	  very	  dynamic	  process.	  Interestingly,	   while	   the	   articulation	   of	   this	   process	   began	   in	  1999,	  the	  Court	  passed	  on	  the	  opportunity	  to	  institutionalize	  the	  reporting	   procedures	   when	   it	   reformed	   its	   Rules	   of	   Procedure	  along	  with	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  in	  2001.64	  	  However,	  in	   the	   Court’s	   newest	   revision	   of	   its	   Rules	   of	   Procedure,	  which	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  January	  1,	  2010,	  the	  Court	  took	  the	  decisive	  step	   of	   providing	   the	   basis	   for	   all	   of	   these	   compliance-­‐related	  procedures.65	  	  	  The	  2010	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  provide	  that	  “[t]he	  procedure	  for	  monitoring	   compliance	  with	   the	   judgments	  and	  other	  decisions	  of	   the	   Court	   shall	   be	   carried	   out	   through	   the	   submission	   of	  reports	   by	   the	   State	   and	   observations	   to	   those	   reports	   by	   the	  victims	   or	   their	   legal	   representatives,”	   and	   that	   “[t]he	  Commission	  shall	  present	  observations	  to	  the	  state’s	  reports	  and	  to	   the	   observations	   of	   the	   victims	   or	   their	   representatives.”66	  	  They	   further	   empower	   the	   Court	   to	   request	   expert	   opinions	  about	   issues	   relating	   to	   compliance	   where	   appropriate,	   and	  provide	   that	   it	   may	   “convene	   the	   State	   and	   the	   victims’	  representatives	  to	  a	  hearing	  in	  order	  to	  monitor	  compliance	  with	  its	   decisions,”	   when	   it	   deems	   appropriate.67	   	   Finally,	   the	   Rules	  provide	   that	   “[o]nce	   the	   Tribunal	   has	   obtained	   all	   relevant	  information,	   it	   shall	   determine	   the	   state	   of	   compliance	  with	   its	  decisions	  and	  issue	  the	  relevant	  orders.”68	   	  These	  provisions	  lay	  out	   a	   flexible,	   though	   fairly	   reliable	   procedure	   that	   allows	   for	  litigants	  involved	  in	  Court	  cases	  to	  strategize	  about	  how	  they	  can	  use	  the	  Court	  to	  apply	  pressure	  on	  the	  state	  after	  a	  decision	  has	  issued.	  	  	  II.	   TESTING	  THE	  COURT’S	  COMPLIANCE	  
 psychological	  treatment).	  
	   64.	   See	  generally	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  June	  1,	  2001,	  OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4	  rev.9	  (2003).	  
	   65.	   See	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Rules	  of	  Procedure,	  supra	  note	  7,	  art.	  69.	  
	   66.	   Id.	  art.	  69.1.	  
	   67.	   Id.	  art.	  69.2-­‐69.3.	  
	   68.	   Id.	  art.	  69.4.	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  PROCEDURES	  AGAINST	  THE	  PRINCIPAL	  RECOMMENDATIONS	  AND	  CRITIQUES	  OF	  INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  ACTORS	  The	  need	  to	  develop	  strategies	  to	   improve	   implementation	  of	  inter-­‐American	   human	   rights	   decisions	   has	   been	   recognized	   by	  system	   adjudicators,	   litigants	   and	   advocates,	   and	   some	   of	   the	  most	   prominent	   actors	   have	   formulated	   recommendations	   on	  how	  to	  address	  this	  challenge.	  	  These	  recommendations	  provide	  a	  coherent	  framework	  to	  evaluate	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Court’s	  compliance	  procedures.	  Former	   President	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court,	   Antonio	  Cançado	  Trinidade,	  consistently	  expressed	  his	  concern	  about	  the	  level	   of	   state	   observance	   of	   the	   Court’s	   decisions.69	   	   Cançado	  became	  an	  outspoken	  proponent	  of	  the	  “Europeanization”	  of	  the	  inter-­‐American	   system	   with	   regard	   to	   implementation	   of	   the	  Court’s	   decisions.	   	   He	   contemplated	   a	   system	   for	   the	   OAS	   in	  which,	  like	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  jurisdiction	  over	  compliance	  with	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  decisions	  would	  pass	  from	  the	  Court	  itself	   to	   the	   political	   organs	   of	   the	   OAS	   once	   a	   decision	   had	  issued.70	  	  Specifically,	  Cançado’s	  proposal	  was	  to	  create	  a	  political	  body	  within	   the	   Permanent	   Council	   of	   the	   OAS	   responsible	   for	  overseeing	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Court’s	   decisions.	   	   The	  European	   model	   is	   enticing	   inasmuch	   as,	   historically,	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   responsible	   for	   the	   enforcement	   of	  judgments	   have	   enjoyed	   relative	   success.71	   	   Moreover,	   this	  
 	   69.	   Antônio	   Augusto	   Cançado	   Trinidade,	   Fragmentos	   de	   Primeras	  
Memorias	   de	   la	   Corte	   Interamericana	   de	   Derechos	   Humanos,	   JORNADAS	   DE	  DERECHO	  INTERNACIONAL	  (2007).	  	   70.	   In	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   enforcement	   of	  European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   judgments	   passes	   to	   the	   Committee	   of	  Ministers,	   a	   political	   organ	   of	   the	   Council	   that	   meets	   in	   closed	   sessions	   to	  deliberate	  about	  state	  implementation	  of	  the	  Court’s	  remedial	  orders.	  See	  Eur.	  Consult.	   Ass.,	   Rules	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	   Ministers	   for	   the	   Supervision	   of	   the	  
Execution	   of	   Judgments	   and	   of	   the	  Terms	   of	   Friendly	   Settlements,	   964th	   Sess.	  (May	  10,	  2006).	  
	   71.	   See	  Darren	  Hawkins	  &	  Wade	  Jacoby,	  Partial	  Compliance:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  the	  European	  and	  Inter-­‐American	  Courts	  for	  Human	  Rights	  (Aug.	  18,	  2008)	  (unpublished	   manuscript),	   available	   at	  	  http://www.stevendroper.com/ECHR%20	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  proposal	  is	  insightful	  because	  it	  acknowledges	  the	  role	  of	  politics	  in	  implementing	  decisions	  of	  the	  Court.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  has	  thus	  far	  not	  been	  taken	  seriously	  as	  a	  proposal	  for	  reform	  by	  the	  OAS	  Member	   States,72	   which	   would	   need	   to	   implement	   this	   change	  through	  the	  OAS	  General	  Assembly.	  Short	   of	   this	   large	   scale	   reform	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   inter-­‐American	  system,	  Cançado	  has	  proposed	  a	  strategy	   for	   the	   “full	  application”	   of	   Article	   65	   of	   the	   American	   Convention,73	   which	  instructs	  the	  Court	  to	  report	  to	  the	  OAS	  General	  Assembly	  every	  year	  and	  “specify,	  in	  particular,	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  state	  has	  not	  complied	   with	   its	   judgments,	   making	   any	   pertinent	  recommendations.”74	   	  This	  strategy	  proposed	  by	  Cançado	  would	  have	   the	  President	  of	   the	  Court	  utilize	   the	   time	  provided	   to	   the	  Court	   during	   the	   General	   Assembly	   to	   denounce	   particularly	  recalcitrant	  states.	   	   Ideally,	   such	  an	  approach	  would	   thrust	   that	  state	   into	   dialogue	   with	   other	   states,	   which	   are	   the	   collective	  guarantors	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  regional	  systems,75	  and	  pressure	  a	  state	   into	   compliance.	   	   Cançado	   cites	   two	   examples	   of	   this	   full	  application	  of	  Article	  65	  from	  his	  term	  as	  President	  of	  the	  Court,	  once	   denouncing	   the	   Fujimori	   regime	   in	   Peru	   for	   its	   refusal	   to	  implement	   Court	   orders	   with	   regard	   to	   its	   conduct	   in	   its	   fight	  against	  domestic	   terrorism,	  and	  again	  denouncing	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago	   for	  practices	   related	   to	  capital	  punishment.76	   	  However,	  
 Hawkins%20and%20Jacoby%20APSA%202008.pdf	   	   (agreeing	   with	   the	  proposition	   that	   the	   ECHR	   theoretically	   has	   higher	   compliance	   than	   the	  IACtHR,	  but	  comparing	  the	  different	  systems	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  explain	  varying	  degrees	  of	  compliance).	  
	   72.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Michael	   J.	   Camilleri	   &	   Vivianna	   Krsticevic,	   Making	  
International	  Law	  Stick:	  Reflections	  on	  Compliance	  with	  Judgments	  in	  the	  Inter-­
American	   Human	   Rights	   System,	   in	   PROTECCIÓN	   INTERNACIONAL	   DE	   DERECHES	  HUMANOS	  Y	  ESTADO	  DE	  DERECHO	  244	  (Joaquí	  Gonzalez	  Ibáñes	  ed.,	  2008).	  	   73.	   Cacado	  Trinidade,	  Jornadas	  de	  Derecho	  Internacional	  (2006).	  
	   74.	   ACHR,	  supra	  note	  14,	  art.	  65.	  
	   75.	   See	   Judge	   Antônio	   A.	   Cançado	   Trindade,	   President,	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   Address	   Before	   the	   Committee	   on	   Juridical	   and	  Political	   Affairs,	   Organization	   of	   American	   States	   (Apr.	   19,	   2002)	   (“[T]he	  collective	   guarantee	   exercised	   by	   the	   Convention’s	   states	   parties	   should	   not	  merely	  be	  reactive,	  coming	   into	  play	  when	  one	  of	   the	  Court’s	   judgments	   is	  not	  observed;	   it	   should	   also	   be	   proactive,	   in	   that	   all	   the	   states	   parties	   should	  previously	  have	  adopted	  positive	  measures	  of	  protection	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  precepts	  of	  the	  American	  Convention.”).	  
	   76.	   See	  Cançado	  Trinidade,	  Fragmentos	  de	  Primeras	  Memorias	  de	   la	  Corte	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   fact	   that	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   Fujimori	   regime	   did	   not	   buckle	   under	   this	  pressure,	  and	  that	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago	  ultimately	  withdrew	  its	  recognition	  of	  the	  Court’s	  jurisdiction	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  viability	   of	   relying	   on	   the	   pressure	   of	   the	   General	   Assembly	   in	  urging	  compliance.	  Where	   Cançado’s	   recommendations	   largely	   focus	   on	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   Court	   and	   the	   Member	   States	   of	   the	  OAS	   vis-­à-­vis	   the	   General	   Assembly,	   other	   observers	   have	  focused	  on	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  Court	  directly	  with	  the	  states.	  	  For	   example,	  Alexandra	  Huneeus	  highlights	   in	   her	  work	  on	   the	  challenge	   of	   achieving	   compliance	   with	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	  orders	   directed	   at	   judiciaries	   and	   public	   ministries	   that	   the	  judges	   and	   prosecutors	   ultimately	   responsible	   for	   compliance	  have	   very	   little	   invested	   in	   the	   cause.77	   	   Huneeus	   suggests	   that	  the	   Court	   itself	   should	   reach	   out	   to	   the	   judicial	   organs	   of	   the	  nations	   against	   which	   they	   issue	   judgments	   and	   build	  relationships	  of	  mutual	  understanding	  to	  foster	  the	  commitment	  of	   these	   state	   actors	   to	   the	   implementation	   project.78	   	   Huneeus	  encourages	   the	   Court	   to	   identify	   specific	   state	   actors	   that	   are	  responsible	   for	   implementing	   Court	   decisions	   at	   the	   domestic	  level,	   and	   simultaneously	   call	   on	   them	   to	   carry	   out	   their	  obligations	  while	   being	  more	  mindful	   of	   how	   they	  will	   receive	  the	   decisions	   and	   elevating	   their	   profile	   by	   incorporating	   them	  into	   a	   regional	   “social	   network”	   of	   persons	   concerned	  with	   the	  rule	  of	  law.79	  Viviana	  Krsticevic,	   one	   of	   the	  most	   seasoned	   litigators	   in	   the	  inter-­‐American	   system,	   has	   produced	   a	   comprehensive	   volume	  on	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   decisions	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  
 
Interamericana	   de	   Derechos	   Humanos,	   19-­‐26	   (discussing	   the	   Court’s	   “full	  application”	   of	   Article	   65	   in	   cases	   of	   severe	   non-­‐compliance,	   and	   recalling	  when	   the	   Court	   denounced	   the	   Fujimori	   regime’s	   non-­‐compliance	   with	   the	  decisions	   of	   the	   Court	   during	   the	   2000	  General	   Assembly	   and	   its	   statement	  against	  Trinidad	  &	  Tobago’s	  reticence	  in	  the	  2003	  General	  Assembly).	  
	   77.	   See	  Alexandra	  Huneeus,	  Courts	  Resisting	  Courts:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Inter-­
American	  Court’s	  Struggle	  to	  Enforce	  Human	  Rights,	  44	  CORNELL	  INT’L	  L.	  J.	  493,	  494	  (2011).	  
	   78.	   Id.	  at	  526.	  
	   79.	   Id.	   at	  529	   (recognizing	   that	   “[c]ourts	  and	  prosecutors	  do	  not	  work	   in	  isolation	  .	  .	  .”).	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  Commission	  and	  Court.80	   	  Krsticevic	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  institutional	  and	  legal	  structures	  within	  countries	  as	  the	  key	  to	  the	   implementation	  of	   inter-­‐American	  human	  rights	  decisions.81	  	  She	   highlights	   formal	   mechanisms	   to	   incorporate	   international	  obligations	   into	   domestic	   court	   proceedings,	   specific	  implementation	   policies	   or	   mechanisms	   for	   coordination	  between	  agencies,	  and	  special	  procedures	   in	   the	   judicial	  sphere	  to	  overcome	  barriers	  to	  compliance.82	   	  A	  subsequent	  volume	  on	  implementation	   issued	   by	   the	   Center	   for	   Justice	   and	  International	   Law	   (CEJIL),	   the	   organization	   Krsticevic	   directs,	  provides	   specific	   considerations	   for	   national	   legislators	   in	  creating	   national	   implementation	   mechanisms.83	   	   Other	  prominent	   inter-­‐American	   actors	   have	   echoed	   this	   call	   for	  national	   implementation	   mechanisms,	   urging	   that	   any	   such	  mechanisms	   should	   have	   a	   “precise	   mandate,”84	   and	   a	  comprehensive	  basis	  for	  the	  interaction	  of	  all	  state	  agencies	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  implementation.85	  	  	  The	   national	   implementation	   mechanism	   model	   shifts	   the	  focus	   from	   the	   OAS	   Member	   States	   as	   collective	   guarantors	   of	  human	   rights	   to	   the	   states	   as	   individual	   guarantors	   of	   human	  rights	   as	   signatories	   to	   the	   American	   Convention.	   	   The	   most	  comprehensive	   versions	   of	   such	   mechanisms	   have	   been	  
 
	   80.	   See	  generally	  CEJIL	  IMPLEMENTATION	  I,	  supra	  note	  52.	  
	   81.	   Id.	  
	   82.	   Id.	  at	  16,	  69-­‐91;	  see	  also	  Camilleri	  &	  Krsticevic,	  supra	  note	  72,	  at	  	  243-­‐44.	  
	   83.	   See	   VIVIANA	   KRSTICEVIC,	   CEJIL,	   IMPLEMENTACIÓN	   DE	   LAS	   DECISIONES	   DEL	  SISTEMA	   INTERAMERICANO	   DE	   DERECHOS	   HUMANOS:	   APORTES	   PARA	   LOS	   PROCESOS	  LEGISLATIVOS	   [IMPLEMENTATION	   OF	   DECISIONS	   OF	   THE	   INTER-­‐AMERICAN	   SYSTEM	   OF	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS:	  CONTRIBUTIONS	  TO	  THE	  LEGISLATIVE	  PROCESS]	   (2009)	   [hereinafter	  CEJIL	  IMPLEMENTATION	  II].	  	   84.	   Soraya	  Long	  Saborio,	  Aciertos	  y	  desaciertos	  de	   la	  Corte	  Interamericana	  
de	  Derechos	  Humanos	  en	  el	  caso	  Baena	  Ricardo	  y	  ortos	  v.	  Panamá	  (Caso	  Ley	  25)	  [Successes	  and	  Failures	  of	  the	  Inter-­American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  Baena	  Ricardo	  et	  al.	  V.	  Panama	  (Case	  Law	  25)],	  5	  REVISTA	  CEJIL	  38	  (2009).	  
	   85.	   See	  Ariel	  E.	  Dulitzky,	  The	  Inter-­American	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  
in	  DUE	  PROCESS	  OF	  LAW	  FOUND.,	  VICTIMS	  UNSILENCED:	  THE	  INTER-­‐AMERICAN	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  SYSTEM	  AND	  TRANSNATIONAL	  JUSTICE	  IN	  LATIN	  AMERICA	  144-­‐46	  (Catherine	  A.	  Sunshine	   ed.,	   Gretta	   K.	   Siebentritt	   trans.,	   2007)	   [hereinafter	   VICTIMS	  UNSILENCED]	   (analyzing	   the	   need	   for	   dialogue	   and	   interaction	   between	   the	  international	   organs	   and	   domestic	   institutions	   to	   ensure	   adequate	  compliance).	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   and	   have	   played	   an	  important	   role	   in	   the	   effort	   to	   implement	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	  inter-­‐American	   bodies	   in	   both	   of	   those	   contexts.86	   	   There	   have	  also	  been	   legislative	  processes	   to	  develop	   implementation	   laws	  in	   countries	   like	   Argentina	   and	   Brazil,	   though	   neither	   has	  produced	   concrete	   results.87	   	   This	   emphasis	   on	   national	  mechanisms	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  establishing	  processes	  and	   identifying	   the	   roles	  of	   specific	   state	   actors	   in	   carrying	  out	  implementation.	   	   Notably,	   however,	   the	   establishment	   of	   such	  mechanisms	   requires	   a	   level	   of	   engagement	   with	   the	   inter-­‐American	   system	   that	   is	   not	   present	   in	   all	   states.	   	   As	   such,	  Krsticevic	   also	   urges	   strategic	   consideration	   of	   compliance	  beyond	   implementation	   mechanisms	   in	   a	   separate	   article	   co-­‐authored	   by	   Michael	   Camilleri,88	   and	   has	   recognized	   in	   more	  recent	   writing	   the	   need	   for	   flexible	   case-­‐specific	   strategies	   for	  compliance.89	  James	   Cavallaro	   and	   Emily	   Schaffer	   have	   observed	   that	  national	   implementation	   mechanisms	   are	   “insufficient	   to	  guarantee	  the	  effective	  implementation	  of	  decisions	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	   supervisory	   bodies,”	   but	   have	   emphasized	   utility	   of	  such	  mechanisms	   to	   activists	   in	   their	  broader	  advocacy	  work.90	  	  
 
	   86.	   See	  Colombia,	  Law	  288/96,	  Regulate	   the	  Procedure	   for	   the	   Indemnity	  of	  Victims	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Violations,	   (Jul.	  5,	  1996);	  see	  also	  Peru,	  Supreme	  Decree	   014-­‐2000-­‐JUS,	   Regulate	   the	   Procedure	   to	   Follow-­‐Up	   on	   the	  Recommendations	   of	   International	   Human	   Rights	   Bodies	   (Dec.	   22,	   2000);	  Supreme	  Decree	  No	   015-­‐2001-­‐JUS,	   Approve	   the	   Regulations	   of	   the	  National	  Human	  Rights	  Advisory	  and	  Create	   the	  Special	  Commission	   to	  Follow-­‐Up	  on	  International	   Procedures	   (Apr.	   27,	   2001);	   Law	   No	   27.775,	   Regulate	   the	  Procedure	  for	  the	  Execution	  of	  Judgments	  Emitted	  by	  Supranational	  Tribunals	  (June	  27,	  2002)	  (unofficial	  translations;	  laws	  not	  available	  in	  English).	  
	   87.	   See	  CEJIL	  IMPLEMENTATION	  I,	  supra	  note	  52,	  Appendix.	  	   88.	   Camilleri	   &	   Krsticevic,	   supra	   note	   72,	   at	   245	   (claiming	   that	   NGOs	  should	   take	   a	  more	   active	   role	   in	   compliance	  monitoring	   as	   it	   “is	   critical	   to	  achieving	  the	  aims	  of	  their	  strategic	  litigation”).	  
	   89.	   See	   Viviana	   Krsticevic,	   A	   Strategy	   for	   Improving	   the	   Level	   of	  
Implementation	   of	   Judgments	   in	   the	   Inter-­American	   System,	   in	   16	   INTERIGHTS	  BULLETIN	   91	   (2010)	   (summarizing	   the	   various	   efforts	   of	   CEJIL	   and	   other	  advocates	   in	   increasing	   compliance	   within	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   System	  through	  procedural	  and	  case	  specific	  changes).	  	   90.	   James	   L.	   Cavallaro	   &	   Emily	   J.	   Schaffer,	   Less	   as	   More:	   Rethinking	  
Supranational	   Litigation	   of	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Rights	   in	   the	   Americas,	   56	  HASTINGS	  L.J.	  217,	  233	  (2004).	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  Cavallaro	  and	  Stephanie	  Erin	  Brewer	  have	  highlighted	  the	  role	  of	  advocacy	   in	   implementation	   efforts	   and	   stressed	   the	   need	   to	  coordinate	   litigation	   with	   “social	   movements	  .	  .	  .	   and	   others	  carrying	  on	  long-­‐term	  advocacy	  campaigns	  or	  pushing	  for	  better	  policies.”91	   	   Cavallaro	   and	   Brewer	   emphasize	   that	   in	   order	   for	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  decisions	  to	  be	  most	  useful	  to	  these	  actors	  in	  carrying	  out	  their	  efforts	  to	   induce	  change,	   the	  tribunal	  must	  be	   attendant	   to	   the	   national	   context	   in	   which	   its	   decision	   will	  come	  down,	  a	  perspective	   that	  has	  been	  echoed	  by	  other	  Court	  observers.92	   	   This	   vision	   of	   implementation	   highlights	   the	  importance	   of	   the	   advocacy	   initiatives	   that	   accompany	   Court	  litigation,	   and	   critique	   the	   Court’s	   streamlined	   procedures	   as	  providing	  less	  space	  to	  develop	  the	  stories	  of	  emblematic	  human	  rights	   abuse,	   which	   undermines	   the	   utility	   of	   the	   decisions	   to	  advocates.	   	   Such	   an	   analysis	   turns	   the	   attention	   of	   the	  implementation	   debate	   to	   the	   advocates	   themselves,	   and	   urges	  creative	   initiatives	   that	   accompany	   inter-­‐American	   litigation	   to	  make	  it	  more	  meaningful.	  	  	  The	   essence	   of	   each	   of	   these	   recommendations	   emphasizes	  alternatively	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  before	  the	  OAS	  General	   Assembly,	   the	   Court	   in	   relation	   to	   specific	   states	   and	  sub-­‐state	   actors,	   implementation	   mechanisms	   developed	   by	  individual	   states,	   and	   advocates	   that	   strategize	   at	   the	   national	  and	   local	   levels.	   	   The	   compliance	   procedures	   that	   have	   been	  developed	   by	   the	   Court	   over	   the	   past	   decade	   respond	   in	   some	  way	   to	   each	   of	   these	   recommendations	   and	   critiques,	   and	  provide	  a	   framework	   for	   their	   further	   incorporation.	   	  First,	  and	  perhaps	   most	   obviously,	   the	   Court’s	   compliance	   procedures	  provide	  a	  means	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  continue	  to	  inform	  the	  General	  Assembly	   about	   issues	   related	   to	   the	   implementation	   of	   its	  reparations	  orders	  with	  regard	  to	  specific	  states.	   	  While	  the	  full	  application	  of	  Article	  65	  as	  described	  by	  Cançado	  has	  been	  used	  sparsely,	   and	   with	   limited	   success,	   the	   compliance	   procedures	  inherently	   value	   the	   exchange	   between	   the	   Court	   and	   the	  
 	   91.	   Cavallaro	  &	  Brewer,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  770.	  	   92.	   Gerald	   L.	   Neuman,	   Import,	   Export,	   and	   Regional	   Consent	   in	   the	   Inter-­
American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  19	  EUR.	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  101,	  109	  (2008)	  (analyzing	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  regional	  treaties	  by	  reference	  to	  global	  human	  rights	  regimes	  and	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights).	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  General	   Assembly	   and	   provide	   the	   possibility	   of	   more	  comprehensive	  reporting	  in	  the	  future,	  written	  and	  otherwise.	  Second,	   the	   compliance	   proceedings	   can	   act	   as	   a	   forum	   for	  different	   implementation	   stakeholders	   to	   interface	   and	   as	   a	  surrogate	  for	  national	  implementation	  mechanisms	  where	  there	  are	   none	   and	   encourage	   the	   establishment	   of	   case-­‐specific	  mechanisms.	   	   Examples	   are	   wide	   ranging,	   and	   include	   a	  compliance	  order	   in	  Molina	  Thiessen	  v.	  Guatemala,	   in	  which	   the	  Court	   urged	   the	   state	   to	   name	   interlocutors	   from	   the	   National	  Commission	  for	  Follow-­‐Up	  and	  Support	  on	  the	  Strengthening	  of	  Justice	   (Comisión	   Nacional	   para	   el	   Seguimiento	   y	   Apoyo	   al	  
Fortalecimiento	   de	   la	   Justicia,	   “CNSAFJ”)	   and	   the	   legislative	  branch	   in	   Guatemala	   to	   develop	   implementation	   plans	   for	  specific	   reparations	  orders	   that	  corresponded	  to	   them.93	   	   In	   the	  compliance	   proceedings	   in	   Mayagna	   (Sumo)	   Awas	   Tingni	  
Community	  v.	  Nicaragua,	   the	  Court	  encouraged	  the	  work	  of	   two	  committees	  created	  by	  Nicaragua	  to	  oversee	  different	  aspects	  of	  compliance,	   each	   of	   which	   provided	   a	   framework	   for	   ongoing	  debate	   on	   the	   national	   level	   about	   difficult	   matters	   related	   to	  implementation.94	   	   Similarly,	   in	   compliance	   with	   the	   Court’s	  decision	   in	   Mapiripan	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,95	   Colombia	  established	   a	   national	   mechanism	   to	   follow	   up	   on	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	   Court	   ordered	   reparations	   in	   that	   case,	  and	  the	  compliance	  procedures	  of	  the	  Court	  provided	  a	  means	  to	  
 	   93.	   Molina	  Theissen	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court,	  “Having	  Seen”	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  16,	  2009),	  available	  
at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/molina_10_07_07%20ing.pdf.	  	   94.	   	  See	   Leonardo	   J.	   Alvarado,	   Prospects	   and	   Challenges	   in	   the	  
Implementation	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples’	   Human	   Rights	   in	   International	   Law:	  
Lessons	  From	  the	  Case	  of	  Awas	  Tingni	  v.	  Nicaragua,	  24	  ARIZ.	  J.	  INT’L	  &	  COMP.	  L.	  609,	   619	   (2007).	   See	   generally	  Mayagna	   (Sumo)	   Awas	   Tingni	   Community	   v.	  Nicaragua,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court,	  “Having	  Seen”	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  May	  7,	  2008)	   [hereinafter	  Awas	  Tingni,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	   2008],	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/	   mayagna_07_05_08_ing.pdf;	  Mayagna	   (Sumo)	   Awas	   Tingni	   Community	   v.	   Nicaragua,	   Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court,	   “Having	  Seen”	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	   Apr.	   3,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mayagna_03_04_09_ing.pdf.	  	   95.	   Mapiripán	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Merits,	   Reparations,	   and	   Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  134,	  ¶	  311	  (Sep.	  15,	  2005).	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  review	  its	  work	  on	  the	  regional	  level.96	  Finally,	   the	   compliance	   phase	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	  litigation	   can	   provide	   an	   authoritative	   response	   to	   states	   that	  push	   back	   against	   national	   advocacy	   strategies	   related	   to	  compliance.	   	   Just	   as	   advocacy	   initiatives	   that	   are	   born	   from	  national	   strategic	   action	   are	   crucial	   to	   give	   Court	   decisions	  meaning,	  the	  compliance	  phase	  of	  Court	  litigation	  provides	  a	  way	  to	   hold	   states	   accountable	   for	   negative	   reactions	   to	   these	  initiatives.	   	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   compliance	   procedures	   provide	  advocates	  one	  way	  to	  recover	  some	  of	  the	  space	  they	  lost	  in	  the	  streamlining	   of	   the	   Court’s	   procedures.	   	   Moreover,	   the	  compliance	   jurisprudence	   that	   is	   produced	   by	   this	   phase	   of	  litigation	  can	  be	  useful	   to	  advocates	  who	  are	  working	   to	  devise	  creative	  implementation	  strategies.	  	  Because	  many	  of	  the	  Court’s	  reparations	   orders	   often	   follow	   a	   pattern,	   and	   the	   challenges	  faced	  by	  advocates	  urging	   that	   states	   comply	  with	   them	  can	  be	  similar,	   this	   body	   of	   jurisprudence	   can	   provide	   a	   means	   for	  advocates	   around	   the	   continent	   to	   communicate	   with	   one	  another	  and	  exchange	  strategies.	  	  Before	  reviewing	  the	  strategic	  value	   of	   this	   jurisprudence,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   systematize	   that	  jurisprudence	   so	   as	   to	   understand	   the	   framework	   that	   it	  provides	   for	   understanding	   tendencies	   of	   states	  with	   regard	   to	  the	  implementation	  of	  Court	  decisions.	  III.	  SYSTEMATIZING	  COMPLIANCE	  JURISPRUDENCE	  IN	  TERMS	  OF	  REPARATIONS	  TO	  BETTER	  UNDERSTAND	  THE	  IMPLEMENTATION	  OF	  COURT	  DECISIONS	  In	   order	   to	   facilitate	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   body	   of	   compliance	  jurisprudence	  that	  has	  been	  developed	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  and	  to	   identify	   some	   of	   its	   uses	   for	   inter-­‐American	   litigants,	  preparation	   for	   the	  present	   article	   included	  a	   review	  of	   all	   115	  reparations	   decisions	   issued	   by	   the	   Court	   between	   1989	   and	  2009.	   	   In	   91	   of	   those	   115	   decisions,	   the	   Court	   has	   issued	  
 	   96.	   Mapiripán	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court,	   “Having	  Seen”	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	   Jul.	  8,	  2009),	  
available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mapiripan_08_07_09_ing.pdf.	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   orders,	   and	   in	   many	   of	   those	   cases	   it	   has	   issued	  multiple	   such	   orders.97	   	   Because	   the	   compliance	   orders	   are	  consistently	   organized	   as	   point-­‐by-­‐point	   discussions	   of	   the	  specific	   reparations	  ordered	  by	   the	  Court,	   this	   information	  was	  organized,	  systematized	  and	  coded	  in	  this	  way.98	  It	   has	   been	   observed	   that	   the	   remedial	   approaches	   by	   the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  have	  evolved	  progressively	  over	  the	  years	  into	  a	  broad	  and	  nuanced	  framework	  for	  repairing	  human	  rights	  violations.99	   	   That	   framework	   has	   also	   become	   somewhat	  consistent,	   and	   therefore	   reliable,	   which	   means	   that	   inter-­‐American	   litigants	   can	   predict	   at	   the	   outset	   the	   range	   of	  reparations	  that	  may	  be	  available	  to	  them	  if	  they	  prevail	  in	  their	  litigation.	   	  Similarly,	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  systematized	  compliance	  jurisprudence	  can	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  likelihood	  of	  achieving	  implementation	  of	  those	  reparations.	  The	  analysis	  undertaken	  for	  this	  article	  identified	  two	  tiers	  of	  reparations,	   separated	   by	   the	   frequency	   with	   which	   they	   have	  been	   ordered.	   	   The	   first	   tier,	   comprised	   of	   those	   reparations	  ordered	   most	   often	   by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court,	   includes:	   (1)	  money	   damages	   and	   costs,	   (2)	   symbolic	   recognitions	   of	  responsibility	   and	   apologies,	   (3)	   legislative	   and	   administrative	  measures	   to	   guarantee	   non-­‐repetition,	   and	   (4)	   investigation,	  prosecution,	  and	  punishment	  of	  those	  responsible.100	  	  	  The	   second	   tier	   of	   reparations	   is	   composed	   of	   a	   variety	   of	  measures	   ordered	   less	   frequently	   but	   still	  with	   some	  degree	   of	  
 	   97.	   These	  91	  cases	  were	  identified	  by	  comparing	  the	  reparations	  decisions	  reported	   by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   on	   its	   website,	   http://www.corteidh.	  or.cr/casos.cfm,	   with	   the	   supervision	   orders	   also	   published	   on	   the	   website,	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/supervision.cfm.	  	   98.	   Compliance	  orders	  issued	  through	  March	  2011	  were	  reviewed	  as	  part	  of	  this	  study.	  
	   99.	   See	   Thomas	   M.	   Antkowiak,	   Remedial	   Approaches	   to	   Human	   Rights	  
Violations:	  The	  Inter-­American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Beyond,	  46	  COLUM.	  J.	  TRANSNAT’L	  L.	  351,	  365–86	   (2008)	   (explaining	   the	  historical	   change	   in	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   reparation	   practices	   that	   has	   led	   to	   a	   varied	   and	  comprehensive	   remedial	   framework	   allowing	   for	   numerous	   non-­‐monetary	  and	  equitable	  remedies).	  
	   100.	   See	  id.	  at	  371–86	  (outlining	  the	  current	  remedial	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  toward	  individuals,	  society	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  discrete	  communities).	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  consistency,	   and	   includes:	   (5)	   human	   rights	   training	   for	   public	  officials,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   restitution	   and	   cessation	  measures,	   such	   as:	   (6)	   annulling	   or	   otherwise	   revising	  national	  judicial	  or	  administrative	  decisions,	  (7)	  provision	  of	  medical	  and	  psychological	  care	  to	  survivors	  of	  human	  rights	  abuse,	  (8)	  return	  of	   victims’	   remains	   to	   their	   next-­‐of-­‐kin,	   (9)	   reinstatement	   to	  prior	  employment,	  (10)	  scholarships	  or	  educational	  benefits	   for	  affected	   persons,	   (11)	   protection	   of	   persons	   at	   risk,	   (12)	  amendment	   of	   public	   records,	   and	   (13)	   the	   establishment	   of	  development	  funds	  and	  other	  community	  remedies.101	  While	   many	   victims’	   representatives	   are	   familiar	   with	   this	  range	  of	  possible	  remedial	  orders	  and	  will	  share	  this	  information	  with	  the	  individuals	  and	  communities	  they	  represent	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  litigation,	  what	  is	  less	  common	  is	  to	  acknowledge	  with	  the	   intended	   beneficiaries	   the	   likelihood	   of	   successful	  implementation	  of	  these	  remedies.	   	  While	  this	   is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  science,	   and	   representatives	   should	   feel	   neither	   completely	  confident	   in	   such	   predictions	   nor	   limited	   by	   them,	   with	   more	  than	   90	   regional	   experiences	   with	   implementation	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   decisions	   on	   record,	   it	   would	   be	   irresponsible	  not	  to	  recognize	  the	  trends.	  	  	  The	  category	  of	  reparations	  that	   is	  most	  consistently	  ordered	  by	   the	   Court	   is	   money	   damages	   and	   costs.	   	   As	   was	   described	  above,	  these	  were	  the	  only	  reparations	  ordered	  in	  the	  first	  Inter-­‐American	   Court	   cases,	   and	   they	   have	   continued	   to	   be	   a	   central	  feature	   of	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   Court	   even	   as	   the	   remedial	  framework	  has	  diversified.	   	  This	  category	   includes	  all	  monetary	  relief	   ordered	   by	   the	   Court	   to	   the	   victims	   and	   survivors	  identified	   in	   the	   proceedings,	   which	   can	   include	   individual	  victims,102	   communities,103	   and	   the	   families	   or	   next-­‐of	   kin	   of	  
 
	   101.	   See	  id.	  
	   102.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Loayza-­‐Tamayo	   v.	   Peru,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	   Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   42,	   ¶	   192(4a)	   (Nov.	   27,	   1998)	   [hereinafter	  Loayza-­‐Tamayo]	   (awarding	   the	   victim,	   Ms.	   Maria	   Elena	   Loayza-­‐Tamayo,	  $99,190.30).	  
	   103.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Sawhoyamaxa	   Indigenous	   Community	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Merits,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  146,	  ¶	  8	  (Mar.	  29,	   2006)	   (mandating	   that	   Paraguay	   pay	   compensation	   for	   non-­‐pecuniary	  damages,	  costs	  and	  expenses	  to	  members	  of	  the	  Sawhoyamaza	  Community).	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  those	   most	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   affected.104	   	   Such	   compensation	   can	   be	  ordered	  to	  repair	  both	  material,	  and	  non-­‐material	  losses.105	  	  This	  category	   also	   includes	   fees	   and	   costs	   that	   states	   are	   often	  ordered	   to	   pay	   to	   lawyers	   and	   NGOs	   that	   represent	   victims	  before	  national	  courts	  and	  the	  inter-­‐American	  bodies.	  	  	  According	   to	   the	   compliance	   jurisprudence	   in	   the	   91	   cases	  reviewed	   in	   preparing	   this	   article,	   the	   Court	   has	   issued	   208	  discrete	   measures	   ordering	   a	   state	   to	   pay	   money	   damages	   or	  costs,	   and	   states	   fully	   complied	  with	   126,	  which	   constitutes	   an	  implementation	   rate	   of	   approximately	   60	   percent.106	   	  While	   60	  percent	   does	   not	   appear	   remarkable,	   considering	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	  rates	  of	  full	  implementation	  below	  20	  percent,	  this	  is	  actually	  quite	  a	  promising	  rate	  of	  compliance.	  	  Indeed,	  monetary	  damages	  are	  among	  the	  most	  reliably	  implemented	  measures,	  so	  for	  those	  survivors	  of	  human	  rights	  abuse	  looking	  principally	  for	  the	   state	   to	   recognize	   their	   injury	   through	   cash	   payments,	   the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  could	  provide	  a	  good	  option.	  Of	   course,	  when	   advising	   the	   potential	   beneficiaries	   of	   inter-­‐American	   litigation,	   these	   rates	   can	   be	   calculated	   for	   specific	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  certain	  types	  of	  violations.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  has	  issued	  13	  such	  orders	  against	  Ecuador,	  and	  the	  Ecuadorian	  state	  has	  implemented	  9	  monetary	  damages	  orders,	  which	   is	   a	   rate	  of	  69	  percent.107	   	  Paraguay	  on	   the	  other	  
 
	   104.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Loayza-­‐Tamayo,	   supra	   note	   102,	   ¶	   192(4b,	   d)	   (awarding	  $18,000	  to	  next	  of	  kin	  of	  the	  victim).	  
	   105.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Escué-­‐Zapata	   v.	   Colombia,	   Merits,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  165,	  ¶	  196(8)	  (July	  4,	  2007)	  (ordering	  Colombia	  to	  pay	  compensation	  for	  pecuniary	  and	  non-­‐pecuniary	  damages).	  	   106.	   The	   central	   criterion	   for	   this	   category	   was	   an	   order	   for	   payment	   of	  money.	   	   Excluded	   from	   this	   category	   are	   those	   orders	   from	   the	   Court	  instructing	  how	  such	  money	  should	  be	  paid,	  such	  as	  orders	   to	  set	  up	  a	   trust	  for	   a	   minor,	   pay	   the	   amount	   in	   a	   specific	   current,	   or	   not	   to	   charge	   taxes.	  	  Additionally,	   related	  orders	   to	  pay	   interest	  on	   late	  payments	  were	  excluded,	  inasmuch	  as	  compliance	  with	  such	  orders	  is	  related	  to	  non-­‐implementation	  of	  underlying	  orders	  and	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  this	  might	  skew	  slightly	  the	  results.	  
	   107.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Acosta-­‐Calderón	   v.	   Ecuador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   7,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/acosta_07_02_08_ing.pdf;	  Albán	  Cornejo	  et	  al.	  v.	  Ecuador,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   27,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.	   cr/docs/supervisiones/cornejo_27_08_10_ing.pdf;	  Benavides-­‐Cevallos	  v.	  Ecuador,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	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  hand	  has	  only	  implemented	  5	  out	  of	  14,	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  rate	  of	  36	  percent.108	   	  As	  another	  point	  of	   comparison,	   the	  Paraguayan	  state	  has	   implemented	  money	  damages	  ordered	   in	   the	   freedom	  of	  expression	  case	  Ricardo	  Canese	  v.	  Paraguay,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  only	   case	   against	   Paraguay	   that	   the	   Court	   has	   deemed	   fully	  implemented	  and	  closed,	  but	  not	   in	   the	   indigenous	   rights	   cases	  
Yakye	  Axa	  v.	  Paraguay	  and	  Sawhoyamaxa	  v.	  Paraguay.109	  	  	  
 of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   27,	   2003),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/	   cantoral_14_11_10_ing.pdf;	  Tibi	   v.	   Ecuador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court	  (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   1,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/tibi_01_07_09%20_ing.pdf	  (recognizing	   that	   several	  orders	   for	  monetary	  damages	  were	  complied	  with,	  but	   also	   noting	   several	   orders	   of	   payment	   still	   fully	   or	   partially	   unfulfilled);	  Suárez-­‐Rosero	   v.	   Ecuador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	  the	   President	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Mar.	   20,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.	   or.cr/docs/supervisiones/suarez_20_03_09.pdf;	  Zambrano-­‐Vélez	   et	   al.	   v.	   Ecuador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   23,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/	   zambrano_23_11_10_ing.pdf	  (declaring	   the	   state	   to	   have	   partially	   failed	   to	   comply	  with	   an	   order	   to	   pay	  monetary	   damages	   by	   failing	   to	   pay	   moratorium	   interest	   owed	   on	   the	  damages).	  	   108.	   	  See	   Ricardo	   Canese	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   6,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/canese_06_08_08_ing.pdf;	  Goiburú	   et	   al.	   v.	   Paraguay,	  Monitoring	   Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   	   Nov.	   19,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/	   docs/supervisiones/goiburu_19_11_09_ing.pdf;	  Vargas-­‐Areco	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   24,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/	   vargas_24_11_10_ing.pdf	  (deciding	  to	  continue	  to	  monitor	  the	  state’s	  failure	  to	  pay	  moratorium	  interest	  for	  compensation	  for	  pecuniary	  and	  non-­‐pecuniary	  damages	  even	  though	  the	  state	  had	  made	  monetary	  payments	  to	  victims).	  
	   109.	   Compare	   Ricardo	   Canese	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   6,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/canese_06_08_08_ing.pdf,	  
with	   Yakye	   Axa	   Indigenous	   Community	   v.	   Paraguay,	  Monitoring	   Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Feb.	  8,	  2008),	  available	  
at	   http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/yakyeaxa_08_02_08-­‐ing.pdf,	   and	   Sawhoyamaxa	   Indigenous	   Community	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Monitoring	  Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶¶	   14-­‐16	  (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   May	   20,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/sawhoya	   maxa_20_05_09.pdf	  (noting	  that	  the	  state	  party	  made	  partial	  payments	  to	  victims).	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   range	   of	   symbolic	   admissions	   of	   responsibility	  and	  apologies	  to	  affected	  persons	  which	  are	   largely	   innovations	  of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court.	   	   These	  measures	   require	   states	   to	  publish	   pertinent	   parts	   of	   the	   final	   decision	   in	   a	   newspaper	   of	  national	   circulation,	   organize	   and	   carry-­‐out	   a	   public	   event	  acknowledging	   international	   responsibility	   for	   human	   rights	  violations	  and	  asking	  forgiveness	  from	  victims,	  build	  memorials,	  name	   plazas,	   streets,	   and	   buildings	   after	   victims,	   and	   create	  scholarships	  in	  victims’	  names.110	  	  	  Out	  of	  131	  such	  measures	  ordered	  by	  the	  Court,	  84	  have	  been	  implemented,	  which	  is	  a	  rate	  of	  approximately	  64	  percent.	  These	  measures	   also	   enjoy	   a	   comparatively	   high	   rate	   of	   compliance,	  which	  means	   that	   victims	   can	   think	   creatively	   about	   how	   they	  would	   like	   their	   hardship	   recognized,	   and	   states	   may	   well	  comply.	   	   Important	   is	   that,	   while	   the	   implementation	   of	   these	  measures	  often	  requires	   little	  more	  than	  a	  simple	  executive	  act,	  they	   can	   be	   incredibly	   significant	   to	   survivors	   of	   human	   rights	  abuse	  that	  have	  searched	  years	  for	  some	  acknowledgment.	  	  	  One	   context	   in	  which	   these	  measures	   have	   been	   particularly	  significant	   is	   in	   Guatemala,	  where	   the	   Court	   has	   ordered	   these	  measures	  in	  seven	  of	  the	  eleven	  cases	  reviewed	  for	  this	  article.111	  	  
 
	   110.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Myrna	   Mack-­‐Chang	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Merits,	   Reparations	   and	  Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	   (ser.	  C)	  No.	  101,	  ¶	  301(7-­‐9,	  11,	  12)	  (Nov.	  25,	   2003)	   (ordering	   the	   state	   to	   publish	   facts	   of	   the	   case	   in	   a	   national	  newspaper,	   carry	   out	   a	   public	   act	   of	   acknowledgment	   of	   responsibility,	  publicly	  honor	  the	  victims,	  establish	  a	  scholarship	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Myrna	  Mack	  Chang,	  and	  name	  a	  well-­‐known	  street	  after	  the	  victim).	  
	   111.	   See,	  e.g.,	   Villagrán-­‐Morales	   et	   al.	   v.	  Guatemala,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   77,	   ¶	   123(17)	   (May	   26,	   2001)	  (ordering	  Guatemala	  to	  designate	  an	  educational	  center	  with	  a	  name	  relating	  to	   the	  victims	  of	   the	   case);	  Raxcacó-­‐Reyes	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Merits,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  133,	  ¶	  145(13)	  (Sept.	  15,	  2005)	  (ordering	  the	  state	  to	  publish	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  in	  a	  national	  newspaper	  or	  gazette);	  Myrna	  Mack-­‐Chang	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Merits,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   101,	   ¶	   301(8,	   9,	   11,	   13)	   (Nov.	   25,	  2003);	  Molina-­‐Theissen	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  108,	  ¶	  —106(4-­‐6)	  (July	  3,	  2004)	  (mandating	  that	  the	  state	  pay	  pecuniary	   and	  non-­‐pecuniary	  damages	   to	   victims	   as	  well	   as	   adopt	  and	   enforce	   legislation	   in	   compliance	   with	   international	   legal	   norms	   and	  treaties);	  Bámaca-­‐Velásquez	   v.	  Guatemala,	  Reparations	   and	  Costs,	   Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  91,	  ¶	  106(3)	  (Feb.	  22,	  2002)	  (ordering	  the	  state	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  In	  those	  seven	  cases,	  the	  Court	  has	  issued	  19	  orders	  for	  symbolic	  reparation,	   and	   Guatemala	   has	   implemented	   all	   but	   2,	   which	  constitutes	   an	   implementation	   rate	   of	   approximately	   89	  percent.112	   	   The	  most	   common	   of	   such	  measures	   are	   orders	   to	  publish	   the	   Court’s	   judgment	   in	   a	   periodical	   of	   national	  circulation,113	   and	   the	   organization	   of	   a	   public	   ceremony	  admitting	   responsibility	   for	   the	   human	   rights	   violations	   and	  asking	   for	   forgiveness.114	   	  Other	   symbolic	  measures	   ordered	  by	  
 to	  publish	   the	   facts	  of	   the	   case	   and	   carry	  out	   an	  act	   of	  public	   recognition	  of	  responsibility);	   Carpio-­‐Nicolle	   et	   al.	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Merits,	   Reparations	   and	  Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   117,	   ¶	  —155(4-­‐6)	   (Nov.	   22,	  2004)	   (ordering	   the	   state	   to	   carry	   out	   a	   public	   act	   in	   recognition	   of	   its	  responsibility	   and	   publish	   facts	   of	   the	   case	   in	   the	   state	   gazette,	   a	   national	  newspaper,	   and	   in	   a	   bulletin	   with	   the	   highest	   circulation	   within	   the	   armed	  forces);	   Plan	   de	   Sánchez	   Massacre	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	  Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   116,	   ¶	   125(2-­‐6)	   (Nov.	   19,	   2004)	  (ordering	   the	   state	   to	   carry	   out	   a	   public	   act	   in	   each	   of	   the	   villages	   affected,	  publicly	  honor	  the	  victims,	  translate	  and	  publish	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	   into	   the	   local	  dialect,	  and	  publish	  the	   facts	  of	   the	   judgment	   in	  national	  publications).	  
	   112.	   See	   Carpio-­‐Nicolle	   et	   al.	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   1,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/carpio_01-­‐07-­‐09_ing.pdf	  (declaring	   Guatemala’s	   failure	   to	   hold	   a	   public	   ceremony	   acknowledging	   its	  responsibility	   as	   it	   was	   ordered	   to	   do);	   Plan	   de	   Sánchez	   Massacre	   v.	  Guatemala,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court,	  ¶	  8(3b)	  (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   1,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/sanchez_01_07_	   09_ing.pdf	  (noting	  Guatemala’s	   failure	   to	   translate	   the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  into	  Maya-­‐Achi	  and	  have	  it	  published).	  
	   113.	   See	  Bámaca-­‐Velásquez	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  91,	  ¶	  106(3)	  (Feb.	  22,	  2002);	  Myrna	  Mack-­‐Chang	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Merits,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	   No.	   101,	   ¶	   301(7)	   (Nov.	   25,	   2003);	   Carpio-­‐Nicolle	   et	   al.	   v.	   Guatemala,	  Merits,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  117,	  ¶	  155(4)	  (Nov.	  22,	  2004);	  Molina-­‐Theissen	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  108,	  ¶	  106(4)	  (July	  3,	  2004);	  Plan	  de	  Sánchez	  Massacre	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Reparations	   and	  Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   116,	   ¶	   125(4)	   (Nov.	   19,	   2004);	   Raxcacó-­‐Reyes	   v.	  Guatemala,	  Merits,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  133,	  ¶	  145(13)	  (Sept.	  15,	  2005).	  
	   114.	   See	  Bámaca-­‐Velásquez	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  91,	  ¶	  106(3)	  (Feb.	  22,	  2002);	  Myrna	  Mack-­‐Chang	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Merits,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	   No.	   101,	   ¶	   301(9)	   (Nov.	   25,	   2003);	   Carpio-­‐Nicolle	   et	   al.	   v.	   Guatemala,	  Merits,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  117,	  ¶	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  the	   Court	   are	   requirements	   to	   name	   educational	   centers	   after	  children	   murdered	   in	   Villagran	   Morales	   and	   Molina	   Thiessen,	  naming	  a	  street	  and	  a	  scholarship	  after	  the	  victim	  in	  Myrna	  Mack	  
Chang,	  and	  creating	  a	  memorial	  chapel	  for	  the	  victims	  in	  Plan	  de	  
Sachez.115	   	   Two	   measures	   that	   have	   not	   been	   implemented	   by	  Guatemala	   include	   an	   order	   to	   translate	   the	   American	  Convention	   into	   Maya-­‐Achi	   and	   disseminate	   it	   within	   the	  community	   of	   Plan	   de	   Sachez,116	   and	   an	   order	   to	   hold	   a	   public	  ceremony	   to	   acknowledge	   state	   responsibility	   for	   the	  extrajudicial	  execution	  of	  a	  political	  opposition	  leader	  in	  Carpio-­
Nicolle.117	  	  In	  the	  Guatemalan	  context,	  the	  state’s	  clear	  willingness	  to	  implement	  this	  type	  of	  order	  should	  encourage	  litigants	  to	  get	  more	   creative	   with	   the	   types	   of	   symbolic	   reparations	   they	  request.	  After	   these	   two	   categories	   most	   often	   ordered	   in	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	  decisions,	  there	  are	  numerous	  others	  that	  reveal	  a	  more	  troubling	  trend	  of	  non-­‐implementation.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  is	   a	   category	   of	   legislative	   and	   administrative	  measures,	  which	  the	   Court	  will	   order	  when	   it	   identifies	   violations	   of	   a	   systemic	  nature.	   	   Such	  measures	  will	  often	  consist	  of	  an	  order	   to	  modify	  national	   legal	   frameworks	   to	   comply	  with	   international	   human	  
 155(5)	  (Nov.	  22,	  2004);	  Molina-­‐Theissen	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  108,	  ¶	  106(5)	  (July	  3,	  2004);	  Plan	  de	  Sánchez	  Massacre	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Reparations	   and	  Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  116,	  ¶	  125(2,	  3)	  (Nov.	  19,	  2004).	  
	   115.	   See	   Villagrán-­‐Morales	   et	   al.	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  77,	  ¶	  123(7)	  (May	  26,	  2001);	  Myrna	  Mack-­‐Chang	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Merits,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	   101,	   ¶	   301(11,	   13)	   (Nov.	   25,	   2003);	  Molina-­‐Theissen	   v.	  Guatemala,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   (ser.	   C)	   No.	  108,	   ¶	   106(6)	   (July	   3,	   2004);	   Plan	   de	   Sánchez	   Massacre	   v.	   Guatemala,	  Reparations	  and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  116,	  ¶	  125(6)	  (Nov.	  19,	  2004).	  	   116.	   	  Plan	  de	  Sánchez	  Massacre	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   125(3)	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   1,	   2009),	  
available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/sanchez_01_07_09_	  ing.pdf.	  	   117.	   	  Carpio-­‐Nicolle	   et	   al.	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court,	  ¶	  2b	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  July	  1,	  2009),	  available	  
at	   http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/carpio_01-­‐07-­‐09_ing.pdf	  (noting	   that	   the	   state	  had	  not	   complied	  with	   the	  order	   to	   carry	  out	   a	  public	  ceremony	  to	  acknowledge	  its	  responsibility).	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  rights	   standards,	   or	   to	   institute	   legislative	   and	   administrative	  measures	  to	  provide	  national	   institutions	  with	  all	   the	  necessary	  means	  to	  effectively	  perform	  their	  duties,	   in	  a	  way	  that	  permits	  the	   enjoyment	   of	   human	   rights.118	   The	   Court	   has	   referred	   to	  improving	   access	   to	   national	   courts,	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   public	  prosecutors,	   and	  prison	  conditions.119	   	  Out	  of	  77	   legislative	  and	  administrative	   measures	   ordered	   by	   the	   Court,	   only	   15	   have	  been	   fully	   implemented,	   which	   constitutes	   a	   rate	   of	  implementation	  of	  approximately	  19	  percent.	  	  If	   these	   reparations	  are	  purely	  administrative	   in	  nature,	   they	  can	  be	  implemented	  by	  the	  executive	  alone;	  however,	  it	  is	  much	  more	   common	   for	   the	   legislature	   to	   be	   implicated	   in	   the	  compliance	   process,	   which	   brings	   with	   it	   a	   unique	   set	   of	  complications.	   	   The	   countries	   that	   have	   implemented	   this	  category	  of	  reparations	  order	  are	  Argentina,	  Bolivia,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Chile,	   Ecuador,	   Guatemala,	   Honduras,	   Nicaragua,	   and	  Paraguay.120	   	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  of	  course	   that	   these	  countries	  
 
	   118.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Chaparro-­‐Álvarez	   &	   Lapo-­‐Íñiguez	   v.	   Ecuador,	   Preliminary	  Objections,	  Merits,	  Reparations,	   and	  Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	   (ser.	  C)	  No.	  170,	  ¶	  289(11)	   (Nov.	  21,	  2007)	   (“The	  state	  must	  adapt	   its	   legislation	  within	   a	   reasonable	   time	   to	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   American	   Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights	  .	  .	  .	  ”).	  
	   119.	   See	   Raxcacó-­‐Reyes	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Merits,	   Reparations	   and	   Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  133,	  ¶	  145(7,	  9)	  (Sept.	  15,	  2005).	  
	   120.	   See	   Herrera-­‐Ulloa	   v.	   Costa	   Rica,	   Supervision	   of	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  22,	  2010),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/herrera_%2022_11_10_ing1.pdf;	   Villagrán-­‐Morales	   et	   al.	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	  H.R.	   Jan.	   27,	   2009),	  available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/villagran_27_01_09_ing.pdf;	  Juan	  Humberto	  Sánchez	  v.	  Honduras,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   President	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   May	   22,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/sanchez_22_05_09.pdf;	  Mayagna	   (Sumo)	   Awas	   Tingni	   Community	   v.	   Nicaragua,	   Monitoring	  Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Apr.	   3,	  2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mayagna_03_04_09_ing.pdf;	  Goiburú	   et	   al.	   v.	   Paraguay,	  Monitoring	   Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   19,	   2009)	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/goiburu_19_11_09_ing.pdf;	  Vargas-­‐Areco	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   24,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/vargas_24_11_10_ing.pdf;	  Barrios	   Altos	   v.	   Peru,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgments,	   Order	   of	   the	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  will	   always	   implement	   such	   measures;	   indeed,	   there	   are	   a	  number	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  some	  of	  these	  same	  countries	  have	  not	  complied	   with	   orders	   to	   develop	   legislative	   or	   administrative	  measures	   to	   address	   systematic	   violations	   identified	   by	   the	  Court.121	  	  Nevertheless,	  a	  history	  of	  the	  legislature	  responding	  to	  
 President	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Dec.	   7,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/barrios_7_12_09.pdf;	  Kimel	  v.	  Argentina,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   15,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/kimel_15_11_10_ing.pdf;	  Trujillo-­‐Oroza	  v.	  Bolivia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   16,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/trujillo_16_11_09_ing.pdf;	  Olmedo-­‐Bustos	  et	  al.	  v.	  Chile,	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	  (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   28,	   2003),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/tentacion_28_11_03_ing.pdf;	  Claude-­‐Reyes	  et	   al.	   v.	  Chile,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   24,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/reyes_24_11_08_ing.pdf;	  Zambrano-­‐Vélez	   et	   al.	   v.	   Ecuador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   23,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/zambrano_23_11_10_ing.pdf..	  
	   121.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Bulacio	   v.	   Argentina,	  Monitoring	   Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court,	  ¶¶	  29-­‐35	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  26,	  2008),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/bulacio_26_11_08_ing1.pdf	  (noting	   Argentina	   had	   taken	   numerous	   steps	   to	   reform	   the	   legislative	  environment	   in	   the	   country	   in	   regards	   to	   protecting	   children	   and	   teenagers	  but	  that	  it	  had	  failed	  to	  fully	  and	  effectively	  adopt	  and	  integrate	  the	  proposed	  reforms	   into	   domestic	   legislation);	   Miguel	   Castro-­‐Castro	   Prison	   v.	   Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  President-­‐in-­‐Office	  of	  the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Dec.	   21,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/castro_21_12_10_ing.pdf	  (noting	  the	  state’s	  complete	  failure	  to	  implement	  any	  orders	  of	  the	  judgment	  including	   creating	   human	   rights	   education	   programs);	   Sawhoyamaxa	  Indigenous	   Community	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   1(7-­‐10)	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   May	   20,	  2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/sawhoyamaxa_20_05_09.pdf	  (calling	  for	  a	  public	  hearing	  in	  Bolivia	  due	  to	  the	  state’s	  failure	  to	  implement	  legislation	   to	   facilitate	   the	   return	   of	   tribal	   lands	   to	   the	   Sawhoyamaxa	  indigenous	   community);	   Yatama	   v.	   Nicaragua,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶¶	   13-­‐18	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   May	   28,	   2010),	  
available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/yatama_28_05_10_ing.pdf	  (noting	   Nicaragua’s	   failure	   to	   comply	   with	   orders	   mandating	   legislative	  changes	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  election	  laws);	  López-­‐Álvarez	  v.	  Honduras,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court,	   ¶¶	  17-­‐20	   (Inter-­‐
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  an	  order	  from	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  creates	  a	  precedent	  that	  can	   make	   an	   argument	   for	   similar	   action	   in	   the	   future	   more	  compelling.	  One	  context	   in	  which	  there	  has	  been	  substantial	  success	  with	  implementing	   these	   types	   of	   measures	   is	   in	   Chile,	   which	  amended	   its	  Constitution	   in	  2003	   in	  compliance	  with	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court’s	   2001	   reparations	   order	   in	   “The	   Last	  
Temptation	  of	  Christ”	   (Olmedo-­Bustos	  et	  al.)	   v.	  Chile.122	   	   In	  2006,	  the	   Court	   issued	   a	   reparations	   order	   in	   Claude-­Reyes	   et	   al.	   v.	  
Chile,	  which	  led	  Chile	  to	  promulgate	  a	  law	  on	  access	  to	  state-­‐held	  information.123	   	   Significantly,	   the	   law	   established	   a	   state	  institution	   dedicated	   to	   the	   oversight	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	   this	  newly	   articulated	   right.	   	   Notably,	   both	   of	   these	   cases	   involved	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  an	  issue	  that	  was	  also	  central	  to	  the	  next	  case	   against	   Chile,	   Palamara-­Iribarne	   v.	   Chile,	   but	   which	   also	  raised	   the	  more	   contentious	   issue	   of	   the	   need	   to	   limit	  military	  jurisdiction.124	   	   The	   proper	   scope	   of	   military	   jurisdiction	   is	   a	  controversial	   issue,	   in	   Chile	   and	   throughout	   the	   region,	   but	   a	  process	  is	  currently	  under	  way	  in	  Chile	  to	  amend	  the	  legislative	  
 Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   6,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/lopezal_06_02_08_ing.pd	  (noting	   the	  state’s	   failure	   to	  adopt	  measures	   to	   reform	   the	  prison	  system	  as	  ordered);	   Fermín	   Ramírez	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶¶	   2(a-­‐b),	   5(a,	   d)	   	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	  May	   9,	  2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/raxcaco_09_05_08_ing.pdf	  (noting	  that	  Guatemala	  failed	  to	  comply	  with	  several	  orders,	   in	  two	  separate	  cases,	   to	   change	   the	   penal	   code,	   reform	   prisons,	   and	   change	   the	   procedure	  relating	  to	  the	  death	  penalty);	  Chaparro-­‐Álvarez	  and	  Lapo-­‐Íñiguez.	  v.	  Ecuador,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court,	  ¶¶	   	  12-­‐15	  (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   22,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/chaparro	   _22_02_11_ing.pdf	  (noting	  the	  state’s	  failure	  to	  purge	  the	  criminal	  records	  of	  the	  victims	  through	  legislative	  reform).	  
	   122.	   See	  Olmedo-­‐Bustos	  et	  al.	  v.	  Chile,	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   Court,	   ¶	   19	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   28,	   2003),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/tentacion_28_11_03_ing.pdf.	  	   123.	   Claude-­‐Reyes	   et	   al.	   v.	   Chile,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶¶	   8-­‐14	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   24,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/reyes_24_11_08_ing.pdf.	  	   124.	   Palamara-­‐Iribarne	   v.	   Chile,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court,	  ¶¶	  27–30	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  30,	  2007),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/palamara_30_11_07_ing.pdf.	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  framework	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  order.	  Perhaps	   the	   greatest	   challenge	   in	   the	   compliance	   context	   is	  achieving	   state	   implementation	   of	   orders	   to	   investigate,	  prosecute	   and	   punish	   those	   responsible	   for	   the	   human	   rights	  violations	   at	   issue	   in	   a	   case.	   	   These	   reparations	   are	   a	  fundamentally	   important	   and	   fairly	   common	   feature	   of	   the	  Court’s	   reparations	   decisions.	   	   The	   standard	   order	  will	   require	  states	   to	   investigate	   the	   facts	   established	   before	   the	   Court,	  identify	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  human	  rights	  violations	  found	  in	  the	  decision,	   and	   prosecute	   and	   sanction	   the	   perpetrators	   in	  accordance	  with	   national	   legal	   norms	   and	   international	   human	  rights	  law.125	  	  This	  refers	  to	  either	  state	  agents	  or	  private	  citizens,	  and	  may	  also	  explicitly	  include	  the	  direct	  perpetrators	  as	  well	  as	  the	  intellectual	  authors	  of	  human	  rights	  violations.126	  	  	  Out	   of	   57	   discrete	   measures	   ordering	   the	   investigation,	  prosecution	   and	   punishment	   of	   human	   rights	   violators,	   only	   1	  has	   been	   fully	   implemented,127	   which	   represents	   a	   2	   percent	  compliance	   rate.	   	   This	   single	   victory	   aside,	   clearly,	   if	   a	   central	  goal	  of	  inter-­‐American	  litigation	  is	  to	  bring	  human	  rights	  abusers	  to	   justice,	   that	   goal	   is	   not	   being	   met.	   	   More	   importantly,	   this	  means	   that	   if	   the	   central	   goal	   of	   victims’	  next	  of	   kin	   is	   to	  bring	  those	  responsible	  to	  justice,	  the	  inter-­‐American	  system	  may	  not	  give	   them	  the	  remedy	   they	  seek.	   	  As	   is	  often	   the	  case,	  pursuing	  justice	  may	  be	  adequate,	  but	   there	   is	   certainly	   a	  difference	  and	  this	   difference	   should	   be	   communicated	   to	   the	   intended	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  litigation.	  The	  second	  tier	  of	  reparations	  orders	  identified	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	   compliance	   jurisprudence	   performed	   for	   this	   article	   are	   less	  consistently	   ordered	   by	   the	   Court,	   but	   appear	   with	   enough	  
 
	   125.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Myrna	   Mack-­‐Chang	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Merits,	   Reparations	   and	  Costs,	  Judgment,	  Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  101,	  ¶	  301(5)	  (Nov.	  25,	  2003).	  
	   126.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Pueblo	   Bello	  Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Merits,	   Reparations	   and	  Costs,	   Judgment,	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  140,	  ¶	  296(7)	  (Jan.	  31,	  2006)	  (ordering	  the	  state	  to	  take	  measures	  to	  investigate	  all	  possible	  participants	  in	  the	   1990	   Pueblo	   Bello	   massacre,	   including	   those	   responsible	   by	   “act	   or	  omission”).	  
	   127.	   See	  Castillo-­‐Páez	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court,	   ¶¶	   7-­‐11	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Apr.	   3,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/castillo_03_04_09_ing.pdf.	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  frequency	   to	   be	   accounted	   for	   in	   the	   case	   planning	   and	  compliance	   strategizing	   processes.	   	   The	   Court	   will	   on	   occasion	  order	   states	   to	   design	   and	   implement	   training	   programs	   for	  public	   officials,	   such	   as	   police,	   armed	   forces,	   and	   judicial	  employees,	   in	   relevant	   areas	   of	   international	   human	   rights	  obligations	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   preventing	   future	   violations	   and	  ensure	   the	   full	   exercise	   of	   all	   rights.	   	   Of	   24	   discrete	   measures	  under	   supervision,	   9	   have	   been	   fully	   implemented,	   which	  represents	   an	   implementation	   rate	   of	   38	   percent.	   States	   that	  have	   complied	   with	   this	   type	   of	   order	   are	   Bolivia,	   Chile,	  Colombia,	  Ecuador,	  and	  Guatemala.128	  One	   interesting	   example	   of	   compliance	   can	   be	   found	   in	  Colombia,	   where	   the	   government	   created	   a	   single	   permanent	  human	   rights	   training	   program	   on	   human	   rights	   law	   and	  international	   humanitarian	   law	   for	   its	   armed	   forces,	   which	  satisfied	  the	  requirements	  of	  four	  separate	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  orders.129	   	   This	   program,	   entitled	   “Comprehensive	   Policy	   on	  
 
	   128.	   See	   Trujillo-­‐Oroza	   v.	   Bolivia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   1d	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   16,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/ituango_07_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Claude-­‐Reyes	  et	   al.	   v.	  Chile,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   Court,	   ¶¶	   15-­‐21	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   24,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/reyes_24_11_08_ing.pdf;	  Rochela	  Massacre	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   1(f)	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   26,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/rochela_26_08_10_ing.pdf;	  Mapiripán	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   1(b)	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   08,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mapiripan_08_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Ituango	  Massacres	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   1a	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   7,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/ituango_07_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Gutiérrez-­‐Soler	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   Court,	   ¶	   1b-­‐c	   	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   	   Jan.	   31,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/gutierrez_31_01_081.pdf;	  Zambrano-­‐Vélez	   et	   al.	   v.	   Ecuador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   1d	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Sept.	   21,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/castillo_03_04_09_ing.pdf;	  Myrna	   Mack-­‐Chang	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   12	   	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Sept.	   12,	   2005),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mack_12_09_051.pdf.	  
	   129.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Gutiérrez-­‐Soler	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶1	   (c-­‐d)	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Jan.	   31,	   2008),	  
available	   at	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  Human	  Rights	  and	  International	  Humanitarian	  Law”	  was	  created	  in	   January	   2008,	   and	   includes	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   “Human	  Rights	  Directorate”	  in	  the	  Army,	  and	  a	  cooperation	  agreement	  with	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Human	  Rights	  Institute	  (“IIDH”)	  to	  supervise	  the	  program.	   	  The	  state	  has	  also	  submitted	  a	  detailed	  report	  on	  the	  program	  during	   a	  private	  hearing	  with	   the	  Court.130	   	   The	  Court	  concluded,	  in	  a	  compliance	  order	  issued	  in	  Mapiripán	  that:	  	  “.	  .	  .	   education	   on	   human	   rights	   within	   the	   Armed	   Forces	   is	   vital	   to	  create	   guarantees	   of	   non-­‐repetition	   of	   facts	   as	   the	   ones	   seen	   in	   the	  instant	   case.	   Therefore,	   it	   positively	   values	   the	   progress	  mentioned	  by	  the	  State	  at	  the	  hearing	  [and]	  ...	  considers	  that	  the	  State	  complied	  with	  this	  measure	  of	  reparation,	  as	  to	  the	  design	  and	  development	  of	  human	   rights	   and	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   training	  program,	  
in	   view	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   are	   permanent	   program.”131	   (Emphasis	  added.)	  Human	   rights	   education	  may	   often	   seem	   like	   an	   appropriate	  means	   of	   addressing	   systematic	   or	   society-­‐wide	   human	   rights	  problems.	   	   Certainly,	   there	   exist	   substantial	   differences	   of	  opinion	   between	   what	   constitutes	   genuine	   human	   rights	  education,	   and	   the	   experiences	   of	   programs	   that	   have	   been	  developed	   in	   compliance	  with	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	   orders	   can	  provide	  an	  important	  perspective	  in	  this	  debate.	  The	   Court	   has	   ordered	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   restitution	   and	  cessation	  measures	  that	  can	  be	   identified	  and	  grouped	  together	  for	   purposes	   of	   analysis.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   Court	   has	   issued	  
 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/gutierrez_31_01_081	   .pdf;	   La	  Rochela	  Massacre	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   1(f)	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   26,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/rochela_26_08_10_ing.pdf;	  Ituango	  Massacres	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   1(a)	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   7,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/ituango_07_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Mapiripán	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court,	   “Considering,”	  ¶¶	  62-­‐64	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	   July	  8,	  2009),	  
available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mapiripan_08_07_09_ing.pdf.	  
	   130.	   See	   Mapiripán	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court,	  “Considering,”	  ¶¶	  62-­‐64	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  July	  8,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mapiripan	  _08_07_09_ing.pdf.	  
	   131.	   Id.	  ¶	  64.	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  orders	   to	   annul	   or	   otherwise	   revisit	   judicial	   or	   administrative	  decisions	  on	  16	  occasions,	  and	  states	  have	  complied	  with	  9	  such	  orders.132	   	   Additionally,	   the	   Court	   has	   ordered	   on	   7	   occasions	  that	  states	  amend	  public	  records	  of	  such	  unjust	  state	  actions,	  and	  states	   have	   complied	   with	   6	   of	   those	   orders.133	   	   This	   could	  provide	   some	   hope	   for	   people	  who	   turn	   to	   the	   inter-­‐American	  system	  to	  address	  unfair	  judicial	  proceedings.	  	  	  Unfortunately,	  other	  restitution	  and	  cessation	  measures	  do	  not	  provide	   the	   same	   type	   of	   promise.	   	   For	   example,	   the	  Court	   has	  ordered	   that	   the	   state	   in	   question	   provide	   medical	   or	  
 
	   132.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Cantos	   v.	   Argentina,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   26,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/cantos_26_08_10_ing.pdf	  (noting	  that	  Argentina	  “has	  failed	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  obligation	  of	  informing	  this	  Court	   about	   the	   measures	   adopted	   to	   comply	   with	   that	   ordered	   in	   the	  Judgment	   on	   merits	   .	   .	   .”);	   Herrera-­‐Ulloa	   v.	   Costa	   Rica,	   Supervision	   of	  Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   22,	  2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/herrera_%2022_11_10_ing1.pdf	   (finding	   that	   Costa	   Rica	   had	   complied	  with	   the	   Court’s	   orders);	   see	   also	  Fermín	  Ramírez	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   May	   9,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/raxcaco_09_05_08_ing.pdf;	   id.	  (reviewing	   compliance	   of	   two	   cases	   in	   one	   order,	   Fermín	   Ramírez	   v.	  
Guatemala	   and	  Raxcaco	   Reyes	   v.	   Guatemala,	   in	  which	   the	   court	   ordered	   the	  state	  to	  annul	  or	  revisit	   judicial	  or	  administrative	  decisions);	  Tristan	  Donoso	  v.	  Panama,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court	  (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Sept.	   1,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/tristan_01_09_10_	   ing.pdf;	  Cantoral-­‐Benavides	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   14,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/cantoral_14_11_10_ing.pdf.	  
	   133.	   See	   Kimel	   v.	  Argentina,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   15,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/kimel_15_11_10_ing.pdf;	  Chaparro-­‐Álvarez	   &	   Lapo-­‐Íñiguez	   v.	   Ecuador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Feb.	  22,	  2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/chaparro_22_02_11_ing.pdf;	  Acosta-­‐Calderón	  v.	  Ecuador,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   7,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/acosta_07_02_08_ing.pdf;	  Gómez-­‐Paquiyauri	   Brothers	   v.	   Peru,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   May	   3,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/gomez_%2003_05_08_ing.pdf.	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   to	   survivors	   of	   human	   rights	   abuse	   on	   30	  occasions,	   and	   every	   one	   of	   those	   orders	   is	   in	   some	   stage	   of	  incomplete	   compliance.134	   	   Similarly,	   in	   10	   cases	   the	   Court	   has	  
 
	   134.	   See	  19	  Tradesmen	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   8,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/comerciantes_08_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Gutiérrez-­‐Soler	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   June	   30,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/gutierrez_30_06_09_ing.pdf;	  Ituango	  Massacres	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   28,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/ituango_28_02_11_ing.pdf;	  Mapiripán	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   8,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mapiripan_08_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Pueblo	   Bello	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   9,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/bello_09_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Rochela	  Massacre	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   26,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/rochela_26_08_10_ing.pdf;	  Valle-­‐Jaramillo	   et	   al.	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   May	   15,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/jaramillo_15_05_11_ing.pdf;	  Escué-­‐Zapata	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   21,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/escue_21_02_11_ing.pdf;	  García-­‐Prieto	   et	   al.	   v.	   El	   Salvador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   27,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/garcia_27_08_10_ing.pdf;	  Serrano-­‐Cruz	   Sisters	   v.	   El	   Salvador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   3,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/serrano_03_02_10_ing.pdf;	  Plan	   de	   Sánchez	   Massacre	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Feb.	  21,	  2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/sanchez_21_02_11_ing.pdf;	  Fermín	  Ramírez	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   May	   9,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/raxcaco_09_05_08_ing.pdf;	   id.	  (reviewing	   compliance	   of	   two	   cases	   in	   one	   order,	   Fermín	   Ramírez	   v.	  
Guatemala	   and	  Raxcaco	   Reyes	   v.	   Guatemala);	   Heliodoro	   Portugal	   v.	   Panama,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Apr.	   20,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/portugal_20_04_10%20ing.pdf;	  Goiburú	  et	  al.	  v.	  Paraguay,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   	   Nov.	   19,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/goiburu_19_11_09_ing.pdf;	  “Juvenile	   Reeducation	   Institute”	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	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  ordered	  the	  state	  to	  either	  ensure	  the	  lives,	  safety	  and	  security	  of	  the	  victims	  and	  their	  representatives,	  or	  guarantee	  a	  safe	  return	  to	   the	   country	   for	   expatriated	   victims,	   7	   of	   which	   were	   issued	  against	  Colombia,	  and	  none	  of	  which	  have	  been	  implemented.135	  
 Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  19,	  2009),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/instituto_19_11_09_ing.pdf;	  Vargas-­‐Areco	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   24,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/vargas_24_11_10_ing.pdf;	  Baldeón-­‐García	   v.	   Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Apr.	   3,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/baldeon%20_03_04_09_ing.pdf;	  Barrios	  Altos	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgments,	  Order	  of	  the	  President	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Dec.	   7,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/barrios_7_12_09.pdf;	  Cantoral-­‐Benavides	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   14,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/cantoral_14_11_10_ing.pdf;	  Cantoral-­‐Huamaní	  &	  García-­‐Santa	  Cruz	   v.	   Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Feb.	  22,	  2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/cantoral_22_02_11_ing.pdf;	  De	  la	  Cruz-­‐Flores	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Sept.	   1,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/cruz_01_09_10_ing.pdf;	  Durand	  &	  Ugarte	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   5,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/durand_05_08_08_ing.pdf;	  García-­‐Asto	  &	  Ramírez-­‐Rojas	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   12,	   2007),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/garcia_12_07_071.pdf;	  Gómez-­‐Palomino	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Dec.	   21,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/gomez_%2021_12_10_ing.pdf;	   Huilca-­‐Tecse	   v.	   Peru,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   7,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/huilca_%2007_02_08_ing.pdf;	  La	  Cantuta	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court	  (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   20,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/cantuta_20_11_09_ing1.pdf;	  Lori	  Berenson-­‐Mejía	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Sept.	   22,	   2006),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/lori_22_09_06_ing.pdf;	  Miguel	  Castro-­‐Castro	  Prison	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	   President-­‐in-­‐Office	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Dec.	   21,	   2010),	  
available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/castro_21_12_10_ing.pdf.	  
	   135.	   See	  19	  Tradesmen	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   10,	   11	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   8,	   2009),	   available	   at	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  better	  received	  by	  states.	  	  The	  Court	  has	  ordered	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  victims	  to	  their	  prior	  employment	   on	   7	   occasions,	   and	   states	   have	   complied	   on	   2	  occasions.136	  	  States	  have	  only	  complied	  with	  1	  of	  12	  Court	  orders	  to	   provide	   scholarships	   and	   other	   educational	   benefits	   for	   the	  victims	  or	  their	  next	  of	  kin.137	  	  The	  Court	  has	  ordered	  the	  state	  to	  locate	   and	   return	   the	   remains	   of	   victims	   of	   extrajudicial	  executions	  and	  forced	  disappearances	  to	  their	  next	  of	  kin	  on	  23	  occasions,	   and	   just	   twice	   states	   have	   complied.138	   	   Finally,	   the	  
 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/comerciantes_08_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Gutiérrez-­‐Soler	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   June	   30,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/gutierrez_30_06_09_ing.pdf;	  Ituango	  Massacres	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   28,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/ituango_28_02_11_ing.pdf;	  Mapiripán	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   8,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mapiripan_08_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Pueblo	   Bello	   Massacre	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   9,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/bello_09_07_09_ing.pdf;	  Valle-­‐Jaramillo	   et	   al.	   v.	   Colombia,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   May	   15,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/jaramillo_15_05_11_ing.pdf;	  “Juvenile	   Reeducation	   Institute”	   v.	   Paraguay,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  19,	  2009),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/instituto_19_11_09_ing.pdf;	  Moiwana	   Community	   v.	   Suriname,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   22,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/moiwana_22_11_10_ing1.pdf;	  Blanco-­‐Romero	   et	   al	   v.	   Venezuela,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   July	   7,	   2009),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/blanco_07_07_09_ing.pdf.	  
	   136.	   See	  De	   la	  Cruz-­‐Flores	   v.	   Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Sep.	   1,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/cruz_01_09_10_ing.pdf;	  Ivcher-­‐Bronstein	  v.	  Peru,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Aug.	   27,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/ivcher_27_08_10_ing1.pdf.	  
	   137.	   See	   Loayza-­‐Tamayo	   v.	   Peru,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   6,	   2008),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/loayza_06_02_08_ing.pdf.	  
	   138.	   See	  Paniagua-­‐Morales	  et	  al.	  v.	  Guatemala,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Feb.	  27,	  2007),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/paniagua_27_11_07_ing.pdf;	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  Court	  has	  ordered	   the	  establishment	  of	  development	   funds	  and	  community	  support	  projects	  in	  9	  cases	  that	  have	  involved	  human	  rights	   abuses	   against	   entire	   communities,	   and	   only	   one	   such	  order	  has	  been	  implemented.139	  	  	  Highlighting	   that	   measures	   of	   non-­‐repetition,	   justice,	  restitution,	   and	   cessation	   have	   exceedingly	   low	   rates	   of	  implementation	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  meant	  to	  imply	  that	  they	  should	  not	  be	  pursued.	  	  Indeed,	  working	  to	  prevent	  future	  harm,	  seeking	  justice	  for	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  human	  rights	  abuse,	  and	  restoring	  victims’	  rights	  can	  be	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  goals	  of	  human	  rights	   litigation,	   and	   are	   often	   what	   the	   participants	   in	   the	  litigation	   most	   desire.	   	   However,	   these	   low	   rates	   of	  implementation	  do	  provide	  a	  basis	  to	  responsibly	  counsel	  clients	  about	   the	   challenges	   they	   will	   face	   in	   the	   course	   of	   inter-­‐American	   litigation.	   	   Additionally,	   they	   provide	   a	   roadmap	   to	  representatives	   for	   how	   they	   should	   be	   organizing	   and	  prioritizing	   their	  evolving	  compliance	  strategies	   throughout	   the	  course	  of	  litigation.	  IV.	  THE	  ROLE	  OF	  COMPLIANCE	  JURISPRUDENCE	  IN	  FORMULATING	  STRATEGIES	  TO	  COMPEL	  STATES	  TO	  IMPLEMENT	  THE	  COURT’S	  REPARATIONS	  ORDERS	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  Court’s	  compliance	  jurisprudence	  can	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  likelihood	  of	  implementation	  of	  different	  reparations,	   it	   can	   help	   litigants	   to	   anticipate	   what	   the	  implementation	  trouble	  areas	  will	  be.	  	  The	  predictability	  of	  these	  challenges,	   together	  with	   the	   years	   that	   such	   litigation	  projects	  endure,	   provides	   an	   important	   opportunity	   for	   representatives	  to	  begin	  to	  strategize	  to	  accomplish	  their	   implementation	  goals.	  	  For	   example,	   if	   the	   intended	  beneficiaries	  of	   a	   certain	   litigation	  
 Juan	  Humberto	  Sánchez	  v.	  Honduras,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  President,	  ¶	  10b	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  21,	  2007),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/sanchez_21_11_07_ing.pdf.	  
	   139.	   See	  Escué-­‐Zapata	  v.	  Colombia,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶	   17-­‐21	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   22,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/escue_18_05_10_ing.pdf	  (noting	  that	  the	  State	  reported	  compliance,	  representatives	  initially	  contested	  exchange	  rate	  then	  eventually	   joined	  Commission	  in	  recognizing	  compliance,	  the	  Court	  then	  declared	  compliance).	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  project	   have	   established	   the	   investigation,	   prosecution	   and	  punishment	  of	   those	   responsible	   for	   the	  disappearance	  of	   their	  family	   member	   as	   the	   central	   goal	   of	   the	   litigation,	   the	  compliance	   jurisprudence	   can	   provide	   guidance	   for	   the	  representative	   in	   explaining	   the	   challenges	   of	   reaching	   such	   a	  goal.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   representative	   has	   access	   to	   57	  documented	   attempts	   at	   achieving	   such	   individualized	  responsibility	   through	   the	   inter-­‐American	   process,	   which	  provides	   dozens	   of	   approaches	   that	   may	   have	   produced	  incremental	  victories.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  compliance	  jurisprudence	  can	  also	  inform	  a	  strategy	  moving	  forward	  to	  both	  shape	  a	  final	  decision	   that	   is	  more	   implementable,	   and	   simultaneously	  work	  to	   create	   the	   conditions	   most	   conducive	   to	   implementation.	  	  Specific	  examples	  are	  drawn	  from	  the	  compliance	  jurisprudence	  of	   the	   first	   tier	   –	   most	   commonly	   ordered	   –	   reparations	  highlighted	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  A.	   APPROACHES	  TO	  MONEY	  DAMAGES	  AND	  SYMBOLIC	  REPARATIONS	  In	  the	  less	  controversial	  context	  of	  money	  damages	  and	  costs,	  there	   are	   lessons	   that	   can	   inform	   litigation	   strategies	   in	   both	  successful	   and	   unsuccessful	   implementation	   efforts.	   	   For	  instance,	   in	   the	   three	   Panamanian	   cases	   in	   which	   compliance	  orders	  have	  been	  handed	  down,	  money	  damages	  and	  costs	  have	  been	   ordered	   on	   6	   occasions	   and	   2	   have	   yet	   to	   reach	  compliance.140	  	  The	  case	  that	  is	  still	  pending	  compliance	  is	  Baena	  
Ricardo	  et	  al	  v.	  Panama,	   in	  which	  the	  Court	  ordered	  the	  state	  to	  pay	   270	   workers	   the	   lost	   salaries	   they	   were	   entitled	   under	  national	  law.141	  	  When	  this	  is	  compared	  with	  the	  other	  two	  cases,	  
 
	   140.	   See	   Baena	   Ricardo	   et	   al.	   v.	   Panama,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Feb.	  22,	  2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/baena_22_02_11_ing.pdf;	  Heliodoro	  Portugal	  v.	  Panama,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Apr.	   20,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/portugal_20_04_10%20ing.pdf;	  Tristan	  Donoso	  v.	  Panama,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Sep.	   1,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/tristan_01_09_10_ing.pdf.	  	   141.	   Baena	  Ricardo	  et	  al.	  v.	  Panama,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	  Judgment,	  Order	   of	   the	   Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Feb.	   22,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/baena_22_02_11_ing.pdf.	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Heliodoro	   Portugal	   v.	   Panama	   and	  Tristan	   Donoso	   v.	   Panama,	   a	  distinction	   that	   is	   instantly	   apparent	   is	   the	   number	   of	   victims,	  which	   corresponds	   directly	   to	   the	   size	   of	   the	   damages	   order.	  	  Taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  compliance	  jurisprudence	  reveals	  that	  the	   problem	   is	   not	   necessarily	   related	   to	   the	   amount	   of	   the	  damages	  ordered,	  but	  that	  the	  Court	  ordered	  the	  state	  to	  pay	  the	  270	   workers	   lost	   salaries	   and	   other	   compensation	   as	   they	   are	  entitled	  under	  national	  legal	  and	  administrative	  procedures.142	  	  	  The	   compliance	   record	   shows	   that	   between	   2002	   and	   2003	  the	   state	   made	   the	   ordered	   payments,	   however	   it	   failed	   to	  provide	   information	   on	   how	   it	   performed	   the	   required	  calculations	   and	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   ultimately	   found	  Panama	  to	  be	  non-­‐compliant	  with	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  reparations	  order.143	   	   In	   a	   second	   round	   of	   payments,	   some	   202	   victims	  signed	  agreements	  with	  the	  State	  while	  others	  refused	  to	  do	  so,	  an	   act	   of	   resistance	   that	   resulted	   in	   non-­‐payment	   for	   many.	  	  Accordingly,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  non-­‐compliance	  in	  this	  case	  is	   only	   partially	   a	   function	   of	   the	   number	   of	   victims	   and	   the	  resulting	   complexity	   of	   the	  matter.	   	   Part	   of	   the	  problem	   is	   that	  the	  final	  decision	  about	  how	  much	  the	  individuals	  should	  be	  paid	  by	   the	   state	   was	   sent	   back	   to	   state	   institutions	   to	   resolve.144	  	  Ultimately,	   it	   appears	   to	   have	   led	   to	   more	   conflicts	   and	   a	  protracted	   process	   of	   implementation	   in	   which	   the	   money	  damages	   –	   apparently	   uncontroversial	   in	   the	   Panamanian	  context	  –	  have	  still	  not	  been	  paid	  after	  a	  decade.145	  The	   lesson	   for	   victims’	   representatives	   that	   are	   developing	  
 
	   142.	   See	   Baena	   Ricardo	   et	   al.	   v.	   Panama,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Feb.	  22,	  2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/baena_22_02_11_ing.pdf.	  
	   143.	   See	   Baena	   Ricardo	   et	   al.	   v.	   Panama,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court,	  ¶	  4	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  28,	  2005),	  available	  
at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/baena_28_11_051.pdf.	  
	   144.	   See	   Baena	   Ricardo	   et	   al.	   v.	   Panama,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   ¶¶	   9-­‐14	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Oct.	   30,	   2008),	  
available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/baena_30_10_08_ing.pdf	  (outlining	  the	  dispute	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  parties	  over	  how	  to	  calculate	  reparations,	  interest,	  and	  what	  law	  or	  procedure	  to	  apply).	  
	   145.	   See	   Baena	   Ricardo	   et	   al.	   v.	   Panama,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	   the	  Court	   (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Feb.	  22,	  2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/baena_22_02_11_ing.pdf.	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   be	   to	  plead	   the	   case	   in	   the	   reparations	   stage	   in	   a	   way	   that	   would	  permit	  the	  Court	  to	  set	  the	  amount	  of	  payment	  to	  each	  victim,	  as	  it	  often	  does.	  	  This	  would	  obviate	  the	  need	  for	  additional	  national	  procedures	  and	  perhaps	  bring	   the	   intended	  beneficiaries	  of	   the	  litigation	   years	   closer	   to	   the	   money	   they	   deserve.	   	   Most	  importantly,	  this	  level	  of	  consideration	  implicates	  a	  phase	  of	  the	  litigation	   that	   is	   probably	   not	   considered	   by	   the	   victims’	  representatives	   when	   they	   are	   first	   preparing	   the	   case.	  	  However,	   if	  money	  payments	   are	   important	   to	   the	   victims,	   and	  the	  process	  itself	  provides	  no	  guarantee	  that	  these	  payments	  will	  be	  made,	   it	   is	   incumbent	  on	  the	  representatives	  that	   they	  begin	  to	  strategize	  in	  this	  regard	  from	  the	  outset.	  A	   similarly	   strategic	   approach	   may	   also	   be	   possible	   in	   the	  context	   of	   symbolic	   reparations.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   previous	  section	   described	   how	   the	   Court	   has	   ordered	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  such	  reparations	  in	  Guatemala,	  and	  the	  implementation	  record	  of	  that	   country	   indicates	   that	   it	   has	   embraced	   this	   approach	   to	  remedying	  past	  wrongs.	   	  This	  past	   track	   record	  of	   success	  may	  encourage	   representatives	   to	  help	   the	   intended	  beneficiaries	   of	  the	   litigation	   to	   brainstorm	   creative	   symbolic	   acts	   that	   might	  help	  their	  healing	  process.	   	  The	  reality	   is	   that	  victims	  of	  human	  rights	  abuse	  very	  rarely	  think	   in	  these	  terms,	  and	  truth	  be	  told,	  neither	   does	   the	   average	   representative.	   	   But	   reference	   to	   the	  compliance	  jurisprudence	  can	  instigate	  this	  creative	  process,	  and	  over	   the	   course	   of	   litigation,	   reasonable	   symbolic	   goals	   can	   be	  set.	   	  Meeting	   these	   goals	   can	   return	   some	   sense	   of	   control	   and	  provide	   for	  a	   feeling	  of	  vindication,	  where	   those	  sensations	  can	  be	   absent	   with	   the	   more	   difficult	   processes	   of	   justice	   and	  systemic	  reform.	  	  	  As	  an	  example,	  a	  recent	  friendly	  settlement	  agreement	  signed	  between	   the	   family	   of	   the	   deposed	   President	   of	   Guatemala,	  Jacobo	   Árbenz	   Guzmán	   and	   the	   Guatemalan	   state	   reflects	   a	  willingness	   to	   go	   far	  beyond	   the	   standard	   remedy.	   	   In	   its	  press	  release,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   reviewed	   some	   of	   the	  reparations	  agreed	  to	  between	  the	  parties:	  the	   State	  will	   hold	   a	   public	   ceremony	   recognizing	   its	   responsibility;	  send	  a	  letter	  of	  apology	  to	  the	  next	  of	  kin;	  name	  a	  hall	  of	  the	  National	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Museum	  of	  History	  and	  the	  highway	  to	   the	  Atlantic	  after	   the	   former	  president;	   revise	   the	   basic	   national	   school	   curriculum	   (Currículo	  Nacional	   Base);	   establish	   a	   degree	   program	   in	   Human	   Rights,	  Pluriculturalism,	   and	   Reconciliation	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples;	   hold	   a	  photographic	   exhibition	   on	   Arbenz	   Guzmán	   and	   his	   legacy	   at	   the	  National	   Museum	   of	   History;	   recover	   the	   wealth	   of	   photographs	   of	  the	  Arbenz	  Guzmán	  family;	  publish	  a	  book	  of	  photos;	  reissue	  the	  book	  
Mi	   Esposo	   el	   President	   Arbenz	   (“My	   Husband	   President	   Arbenz”);	  prepare	  and	  publish	  a	  biography	  of	  the	  former	  President;	  and	  issue	  a	  series	  of	  postage	  stamps	  in	  his	  honor.146	  As	   negotiated	   outcomes,	   friendly	   settlement	   agreements	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  to	  achieve	  what	  might	  not	  otherwise	  be	  available	   through	   litigation.	   	   Such	   negotiations,	   however,	   are	  subject	   to	   the	   implementation	   considerations	   that	   apply	   to	  litigated	  outcomes,	  and	  knowing	  that	  Guatemala	  has	  historically	  been	  open	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  symbolic	  reparations	  undoubtedly	  encouraged	   the	   creativity	   reflected	   in	   the	   above	   agreement.	  	  While	  the	  parties	  have	  yet	  to	  report	  on	  implementation,	  there	  is	  cause	  for	  optimism.	  The	  preceding	  examples	  touch	  on	  the	  two	  types	  of	  reparations	  that	  are	  most	  often	  ordered	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court,	  which	  also	   enjoy	   the	   highest	   rates	   of	   compliance.	   	   The	   situation	  obviously	   complicates	   considerably	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  legislative	   and	   administrative	   measures	   of	   non-­‐repetition,	   and	  the	   orders	   to	   investigate,	   prosecute,	   and	   punish	   perpetrators	  that	   are	   rarely,	   if	   ever,	   implemented	   by	   offending	   states.	   	   This	  makes	  compliance	  strategies	  that	  much	  more	  imperative	  in	  these	  areas,	   and	   the	  potential	   value	  of	   compliance	   jurisprudence	   that	  much	  greater.	  B.	   CONSIDERATIONS	  FOR	  IMPLEMENTING	  LEGISLATIVE	  REFORMS	  Examples	   of	   success	   in	   urging	   national	   administrative	   and	  legislative	   reform	   pursuant	   to	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   orders	   are	  few	  and	  far	  between,	  but	  those	  that	  exist	  should	  be	  fully	  explored	  
 	   146.	   Press	  Release,	  IACHR	  Satisfied	  with	  Friendly	  Settlement	  Agreement	  in	  Arbenz	  Case	   Involving	  Guatemala,	   IACHR	  Press	  Release	  No.	   46/11	   (May	  20,	  2011)	   ;	  see	  also	  Elizabeth	  Malkin,	  Guatemala	  to	  Restore	  Legacy	  of	  a	  President	  
the	   U.S.	   Helped	   Depose,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	   May	   23,	   2011,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/	  05/24/world/americas/24guatemala.html.	  
	   	  
310	   AM.	  U.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	   [27:2	  as	  models	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   A	   range	   of	   examples	   exist,	  including	   the	   development	   of	   legislative	   initiatives	   to	   protect	  vulnerable	   populations,147	   the	   establishment	   of	   certain	   human	  rights	   violations	   as	   crimes	   in	   the	   national	   legal	   framework,148	  reforming	   court	   procedures	   to	   provide	   adequate	   due	   process	  guarantees,149	  and	  demarcating	  and	  titling	  indigenous	  lands.150	  In	   the	   case	   of	   Villagran	   Morales	   v.	   Guatemala,	   the	   Court	  ultimately	   found	   that	   Guatemala	   complied	   with	   its	   order	   to	  amend	  its	  internal	  legislation	  to	  provide	  adequate	  protection	  for	  minors	  when	   it	  adopted	   the	   Integral	  Protection	  of	  Children	  and	  Adolescents	  Act	  by	  Decree	  27-­‐03,	  which	  protects	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  child	   in	   accordance	   with	   Article	   19	   of	   the	   American	  Convention.151	  	  An	  important	  aspect	  of	  this	  compliance	  effort	  was	  highlighted	  by	   the	   representatives,	  who	   reported	   that	   the	   state	  created	  an	  Office	  of	  the	  Public	  Defender	  of	  Children	  and	  Youth	  as	  well	   as	   courts	   specializing	   in	   children	   and	   adolescents,	   and	  indicated	   that	   such	   institutional	   developments	   would	   facilitate	  monitoring	  compliance	  with	  the	  new	  legislation.152	   	  Notably,	  the	  Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   highlighted	   that	   this	   change	   came	  about	   after	   an	   “important	   effort	   by	   civil	   society	   during	   many	  years.”	  153	  	  While	  there	  is	  not	  an	  abundance	  of	  information	  about	  this	   effort	   in	   the	   supervision	   jurisprudence,	   the	   models	   for	  institutional	   implementation	   and	   oversight	   noted	   by	   the	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  representatives	  are	  important.	  	  The	   Bolivian	   state	   complied	  with	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court’s	  order	   to	   incorporate	   the	   crime	  of	   forced	  disappearance	   into	   its	  legislative	  framework	  in	  Trujillo	  Oroza	  v.	  Bolivia.154	  	  This	  process	  started	   with	   the	   executive	   branch	   urging	   the	   legislature	   to	  consider	  during	  its	  2004-­‐2005	  sessions	  a	  proposal	  to	  criminalize	  forced	  disappearance	  that	  had	  been	  introduced	  in	  2001-­‐2002.155	  	  In	   2005,	   purportedly	   in	   response	   to	   these	   urgings	   by	   the	  executive,	  the	  legislature	  began	  working	  on	  a	  technical	  report	  on	  the	   proposal	   to	   incorporate	   the	   crime	   of	   forced	   disappearance	  into	   national	   law.156	   	   The	   Court	   recognized	   the	   concerns	   of	   the	  Commission	  that	  this	  process	  had	  been	  ongoing	  for	  many	  years,	  and	   recalling	   that	   it	   had	   ordered	   the	   promulgation	   of	   such	  legislation	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  period.157	   	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Bolivian	   state	   completed	   this	   process	  when	   it	   incorporated	   the	  crime	   of	   forced	   disappearance	   of	   people	   into	   a	   section	   in	   its	  Penal	   Code	   through	   the	   enactment	   of	   National	   Act	   Nº	   3326.158	  	  This	   process	   highlights	   both	   the	   importance	   of	   generating	   a	  legislative	   proposal	   in	   advance,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   importance	   of	  pronouncements	   by	   the	   executive	   and	   the	   elaboration	   of	  analytical	   reports	   when	   legislation	   ordered	   by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	  is	  pending	  on	  the	  national	  level.	  More	   complex	   legislative	   processes	   are	   also	   recorded	   in	   the	  compliance	   jurisprudence,	   such	   as	   the	   process	   by	   which	   Costa	  Rica	  expanded	  the	  ability	  to	  appeal	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  use	  the	  “recourse	   of	   cassation”	   in	   compliance	   with	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	  decision	  in	  Herrera	  Ulloa	  v.	  Costa	  Rica.159	   	  Within	  a	  couple	  years	  of	  the	  Court’s	  decision,	  the	  state	  reported	  that	  a	  bill	  for	  the	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  enactment	   of	   a	   law	   entitled	   “Relaxation	   of	   Criminal	   Cassation	  Requirements	   Law”	   was	   unanimously	   approved	   by	   the	  Legislative	   Assembly’s	   Permanent	   Commission	   on	   Legal	  Affairs.160	   	   The	   state	   further	   reported	   that	   both	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   the	   Criminal	   Cassation	   Court	   had	   adjusted	  their	   case	   law	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	  decision,	   and	   claimed	   that	   implementation	   was	   near	  completion.161	  	  	  The	   representatives	   in	   this	   case	   argued	   that	   the	   proposed	  reform	  was	   a	   compromise	  between	   the	   existing	   judicial	   system	  and	   the	   one	   envisioned	   by	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   decision,	  and	   that	   a	   genuine	   guarantee	   of	   appeal	   was	  more	   appropriate	  than	  a	  relaxation	  of	  existing	  onerous	  requirements	  in	  the	  appeals	  process.162	   	   The	   Commission	   highlighted	   a	   different	   legislative	  proposal	  mentioned	  by	  the	  state	  in	  a	  compliance	  hearing	  before	  the	   Court,	   a	   “bill	   to	   establish	   the	   motion	   for	   appeal,	   introduce	  other	  amendments	  to	  appellate	  proceedings	  and	  adopt	  new	  trial	  rules,”	   which	   it	   felt	   would	   genuinely	   remedy	   the	   situation.163	  	  This	   was	   ultimately	   the	   proposal	   passed	   by	   the	   Costa	   Rican	  legislature,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  consensus	  among	  the	  parties	  that	  the	  state	  had	  fully	  complied	  with	  the	  Court’s	  order.164	  	  An	  important	  strategy	   to	   highlight	   in	   these	   proceedings	   was	   the	   amicus	  participation	   of	   prominent	   national	   lawyers	   in	   the	   compliance	  proceedings,	  some	  of	  whom	  were	  also	  active	  in	  lobbying	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  congressional	  bill	  that	  was	  ultimately	  passed	  and	  deemed	  to	   constitute	   compliance	   with	   the	   Court’s	   reparations	   order.165	  	  As	   described	   above,	   the	   possibility	   of	   expert	   opinions	   with	  regard	   to	   implementation	   is	   specifically	   contemplated	   by	   the	  Court’s	  2010	  Rules	  of	  Procedure.	  In	   the	   supervision	   phase	   of	   Mayagna	   (Sumo)	   Awas	   Tingni	  
Community	   v.	   Nicaragua,	   the	   state	   reported	   on	   the	   adoption	   of	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  Act	   No.	   445,	   entitled	   “Act	   concerning	   the	   Communal	   Property	  Regime	  of	  the	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Ethnic	  Communities	  of	  the	  Autonomous	   Regions	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   Coast	   and	   of	   the	   Coco,	  Bocay,	   Indio	   and	  Maiz	  Rivers.”166	   	   This	  was	   the	   first	  decision	  of	  any	  supranational	  tribunal	  that	  recognized	  the	  special	  quality	  of	  indigenous	   land	   rights,	   and	   it	   continues	   to	   be	   the	   only	   inter-­‐American	   case	   in	   which	   an	   order	   to	   demarcate	   and	   title	  indigenous	   land	   has	   been	   fully	   implemented.	   	   For	   this	   reason,	  advocates	  should	  pay	  special	  attention	   to	   the	   legislative	  vehicle	  that	   facilitated	   compliance.	   	   The	   law	   established	   a	   specific	  procedure	   for	   the	   demarcation	   and	   titling	   of	   lands	   by	  institutional	  authorities,	  which	  included	  the	  following	  stages:	  (1)	  presentation	  of	  the	  demarcation	  application	  to	  the	  Intersectoral	  Demarcation	   and	   Titling	   Commission	   (“CIDT”),	   which	   must	   be	  accompanied	   by	   a	   document	   called	   a	   “diagnosis”;	   (2)	   dispute	  settlement;	   (3)	   measurement	   of	   the	   land	   and	   marking	   of	   the	  boundaries;	   (4)	   titling,	   and	   (5)	   clearance	   (dealing	   with	   non-­‐indigenous	   third	   parties	   who	   may	   be	   in	   the	   area	   claimed).167	  	  Notably,	  money	  was	  specifically	  allocated	  for	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  initial	  report	  on	  titling	  the	  lands,	  and	  a	  consultancy	  firm	  was	  hired	  for	  this	  purpose.168	  It	   is	   important	   to	   highlight	   that	   the	   community’s	  representatives	   took	   the	   position	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  supervision	   proceedings	   that	   the	   excessive	   delay	   in	   moving	  between	  the	  stages	  established	  by	  the	  law	  made	  it	  ineffective.169	  	  Despite	   this	   position	   taken	   by	   the	   representatives,	   the	  Commission	  opined	  that	  the	  law	  constituted	  compliance	  and	  the	  Court	  ultimately	   took	   this	  position	  as	  well.170	   	  This	   is	   important	  to	   highlight	   because	   it	   demonstrates	   the	   utility	   of	   building	  reasonable	   timeframes	   into	   legislation	   of	   this	   nature.	   	   Further,	  the	   supervision	   orders	   can	   provide	   important	   guidance	   on	   the	  means	   for	   overcoming	   time	   delays,	   such	   as	   emphasizing	   when	  more	   financial	   resources	   might	   be	   necessary	   and	   when	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  consultants	  could	  be	  useful.171	  Certain	   lessons	   can	  be	  generalized	   from	   these	  experiences	   in	  the	  compliance	  proceedings	  of	  the	  Court.	   	  Villagran	  Morales	  and	  the	   Awas	   Tingni	   proceedings	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	  normative	   development	   accompanied	   by	   an	   institutional	  framework	   within	   the	   state	   to	   oversee	   implementation.	   	   Awas	  
Tingni,	   which	   provides	   more	   detail	   about	   the	   various	  considerations,	  highlights	  costs	  and	  the	  contracting	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	   to	   facilitate	   the	  process	  of	   compliance,	  which	  can	   inform	  the	  nature	  of	  future	  requests	  to	  the	  Court	  in	  both	  the	  reparations	  and	   supervision	   phases	   of	   litigation.	   	   All	   of	   these	   examples	  counsel	   in	  favor	  of	  developing	  legislative	  proposals,	  and	  Trujillo	  
Oroza	  and	  Herrera	  Ulloa	  can	  be	  read	  to	  encourage	  the	  initiation	  of	   legislative	   processes	   before	   a	   final	   decision	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	  is	  issued	  in	  a	  particular	  case.	  	  	  Any	   legislative	   process	   developed	  with	   the	   aim	  of	   complying	  with	  a	  decision	  of	   the	  Court	   is	  going	  to	  take	  time,	  and	  often	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  distinguishes	  such	  a	  legislative	  process	  from	  any	  other	  is	  of	  its	  resonance	  with	  a	  Court	  decision.	  	  Accordingly,	  any	  efforts	  to	  start	  such	  a	  process	  in	  anticipation	  of	  a	  decision	  would	  be	  important,	  and	  if	  a	  proposal	  is	  already	  being	  considered	  when	  the	  Court	  decision	  comes	  down,	  the	  process	  can	  be	  reinvigorated	  as	  opposed	  to	  simply	   initiated.	   	  Finally,	  Herrera	  Ulloa	  highlights	  the	  important	  role	  of	  the	  supervision	  hearings	  and	  the	  authority	  of	   the	   Court	   to	   compel	   the	   state	   to	   reconsider	   an	   inadequate	  legislative	   proposal	   and	   refine	   its	   efforts,	   and	   points	   to	   the	  possible	   role	   of	   expert	   opinions	   to	   inform	   the	   Court	   in	   this	  regard.	   C.	   ANTICIPATING	  BARRIERS	  TO	  JUSTICE	  As	  was	  noted	   in	   the	  previous	  section,	   there	   is	  only	  one	  Court	  order	   to	   investigate,	   prosecute	   and	   punish	   persons	   responsible	  for	   human	   rights	   violations	   that	   has	   been	   fully	   implemented.	  	  That	  case,	  Castillo	  Páez	  v.	  Peru,	  will	  be	  explored	  below.	   	  It	  bears	  emphasis	  that	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  contribute	  to	  the	  low	  level	  of	  full	   implementation	   of	   justice	  measures.	   	   Often	   cited	   problems	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  are	   that	   judges	   and	   prosecutors	   responsible	   for	   opening	   these	  investigations	   can	   be	   the	   subject	   of	   extreme	   political	   pressure,	  severe	   resource	   constraints,	   and,	   in	   some	   contexts,	   serious	  physical	  danger.	  	  All	  of	  these	  issues	  can	  compound	  the	  challenges	  inherent	   in	  achieving	  full	  accountability	   for	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	   which	   often	   implicate	   numerous	   state	   actors	   from	   all	  different	   levels	   of	   government.	   	   In	   this	   context,	   partial	  compliance	  can	  still	  represent	  a	  substantial	  victory.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	   obvious	   example	   is	   the	   investigation,	   prosecution	   and	  punishment	   of	   former	   Peruvian	   President	   Alberto	   Fujimori,	   his	  security	  chief	  Vladimiro	  Montesinos,	  and	  various	  members	  of	  the	  band	  of	  political	  assassins	  known	  as	  Grupo	  Colina,	  all	  reported	  as	  partial	  compliance	  with	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  decisions	  in	  La	  
Cantuta	   v.	   Peru	   and	  Barrios	   Altos	   v.	   Peru.172	   	   Accordingly,	  while	  cases	  of	  partial	  compliance	  could	  easily	  be	  an	   important	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  about	  strategies	   for	  compliance	  with	  any	   type	  of	  inter-­‐American	   remedy,	   they	   are	   of	   particular	   value	   to	   an	  analysis	  of	  barriers	  to	  justice	  and	  will	  be	  included	  here.	  Addressing	  first	  the	  issue	  of	  investigation,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	   considerations	   that	   should	   be	   highlighted.	   	   The	   first	   is	   that	  opening	   investigations,	   while	   perhaps	   not	   difficult	   as	   a	   formal	  matter,	   can	   be	   very	   complicated	   as	   a	   political	  matter	  when	   the	  suspected	   perpetrators	   are	   state	   agents.	   	   For	   example,	   three	  years	   after	   the	   Court	   issued	   its	   2007	   reparations	   order	   in	  
Zambrano-­Vélez	   et	   al.	   v.	   Ecuador	   to	   investigate	   a	   1993	  extrajudicial	   execution,	   the	   investigation	   was	   still	   in	   its	   initial	  stage.173	   	   The	   state	   reported	   to	   the	   Court	   that	   it	   was	   in	   direct	  communication	   with	   the	   Prosecutor	   General’s	   office	   about	   its	  error	   in	   failing	   to	   properly	   investigate,	   and	   that	   it	   had	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   Monitoring	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  with	   the	  Public	  Defense	  Office	   to	  present	  an	  action	  of	   non-­‐compliance	   with	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   before	   the	  national	   courts.174	   	   Additionally,	   the	   state	   indicated	   that	   it	   had	  initiated	  disciplinary	  actions	  against	   the	   judge	   that	  had	   initially	  pronounced	  the	  statutory	  period	  for	  prosecution	  to	  have	  run	  —	  a	  common	  problem	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.175	  	  Representatives	   rightfully	   noted	   that	   these	   efforts	   had	   not	  brought	  about	  meaningful	  action.176	  In	   Garrido	   and	   Baigorria	   v.	   Argentina,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	  Mendoza,	   in	   an	   implicit	   recognition	   of	   the	   inadequacies	   of	   the	  institutional	   mechanisms	   in	   place	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   necessary	  investigation,	   created	   an	   ad	   hoc	   Investigation	   Commission	  through	   an	   administrative	   provision.177	   	   That	   Commission	  carried	  out	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  forced	  disappearance	  of	  the	  victims	  and	  submitted	  a	  final	  report	  that	  was	  later	  published	  and	  presented	   in	   an	   official	   and	   public	   ceremony.178	   	   As	   a	   result	   of	  this	   investigation,	   a	   judge	  was	   removed	   from	   office	   because	   of	  irregularities	   in	   the	   proceedings,	   and	   monetary	   rewards	   were	  publically	  offered	  for	  information	  about	  the	  disappearances	  and	  the	  victims’	  remains.179	  Creating	   ad	   hoc	   mechanisms	   is	   one	   way	   to	   compensate	   for	  inadequacies	   in	   existing	   state	   institutions,	   but	   it	   is	   not	  sustainable.	  	  For	  that	  reason,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  also	  focus	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  state	  institutions	  have	  grown	  to	  better	  handle	  the	  investigation	   and	   prosecution	   of	   human	   rights	   violations.	  	  
Castillo	   Páez	   v.	   Peru,	   the	   one	   example	   of	   full	   compliance	   cited	  above,	   provides	   an	   important	   example	   of	   how	   judiciaries	   can	  create	   the	   conditions	   necessary	   to	   implement	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	   decisions	   through	   institutional	   development	   and	   judicial	  reasoning.	  	  After	  the	  Court’s	  1998	  reparations	  order,180	  the	  state	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  reported	   that	   by	   2002	   it	   had	   initiated	   investigations	   and	  formalized	   criminal	   complaints	   against	   16	   suspects.181	   	   The	  representatives	  pointed	  out	  however	   that	   these	  people	  had	  not	  been	   charged	   with	   forced	   disappearance	   —	   a	   crime	   against	  humanity	  —	  because	  at	  the	  time	  no	  such	  crime	  existed	  under	  the	  Peruvian	   criminal	   code,	   and	   that	   decision	   had	   “resulted	   in	   a	  different	   focus	   on	   the	   investigation	   in	   the	   instant	   case	   and	   in	  allowing	   the	   indictees	   to	   remain	   at	   large.”182	   	   In	   2004,	   the	  Peruvian	   judiciary	  created	  the	  National	  Criminal	  Chamber,	  with	  jurisdiction	   to	  hear	   “crimes	   against	   [h]umanity	   and	   crimes	   that	  constituted	  cases	  of	  violations	  to	  human	  rights,”	  and	  in	  2005,	  the	  indictees	  were	   charged	  with	   forced	   disappearance.183	   	   In	   2007-­‐08,	  four	  of	  the	  accused	  were	  found	  guilty	  of	  forced	  disappearance	  and	   the	   presiding	   court	   specifically	   rejected	   their	   defense	   that	  forced	   disappearance	   did	   not	   exist	   under	   Peruvian	   law	   at	   the	  time	  of	  the	  offense,	  and	  found	  that	  certain	  elements	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  forced	  disappearance	  continued	  until	  the	  bodies	  were	  located,	  and	  prosecution	  of	  the	  ongoing	  crime	  was	  therefore	  permitted.184	  	  An	   appeal	   by	   those	   convicted	   was	   rejected	   on	   this	   same	  rationale.185	  	  	  This	   means	   of	   judicially	   addressing	   an	   impediment	   to	  meaningful	  prosecution	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  example	  to	  others	  facing	  the	   challenge	   of	   holding	   persons	   accountable	   for	   crimes	   that	  occurred	  many	  years	  prior.	  	  Problems	  of	  this	  nature	  are	  frequent	  in	   the	   context	   of	   regional	   human	   rights	   litigation,	   and	  representatives	  have	  had	   to	   face	   impediments	   to	   justice	  arising	  from	   statutes	   of	   limitation,	   the	   prohibition	   against	   instituting	  criminal	  proceedings	  against	  the	  same	  person	  for	  the	  same	  crime	  twice	   (“double	   jeopardy”),	   and	   amnesty	   laws	   that	   prohibit	  
 H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  43	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  prosecution	  of	  members	  of	  former	  authoritarian	  regimes.186	  	  For	  example,	   a	   statute	   of	   limitations	   was	   one	   of	   the	   problems	  mentioned	  above	  in	  the	  short	  discussion	  of	  Zambrano-­Vélez	  et	  al.	  
v.	  Ecuador,	  and	   it	  has	  acted	  as	  an	   impediment	  to	  prosecution	   in	  other	  Ecuadorian	  cases,	  such	  as	  Benavides-­Cevallos	  v.	  Ecuador.187	  	  The	  compliance	  proceedings	  in	  Bulacio	  v.	  Argentina	  provide	  one	  example	   of	   a	   case	   in	   which	   a	   national	   court	   has	   rejected	   a	  defense	   based	   on	   a	   statute	   of	   limitations,	   finding	   that	   such	   a	  statute	   cannot	   act	   as	   an	   impediment	   to	   the	   investigation	   and	  prosecution	  of	  human	  rights	  violations.188	  	  Despite	  this	  important	  judicial	  development	   in	   that	  case,	   the	  compliance	   jurisprudence	  indicates	  that	  the	  investigation	  had	  yet	  to	  conclude	  17	  years	  after	  the	  violations,	  and	  the	  courts	  remained	  susceptible	   to	   the	  delay	  tactics	   of	   the	   defense.189	   	   This	   is	   an	   important	   reminder	   of	   the	  complexity	   of	   implementing	   investigation	   orders	   and	   that	  representatives	  must	  have	  both	  legal	  arguments	  in	  their	  arsenal	  about	   the	   inapplicability	   of	   limitations	   on	   review	   as	   well	   as	  perseverance,	  and	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  often	  most	  valuable.	  Finally,	   even	   in	   those	   cases	   in	   which	   an	   investigation	   is	  completed,	   and	   a	   prosecution	   effectively	   carried	   out,	   there	   are	  potential	   impediments	   to	   the	   actual	   punishment	   of	   those	  responsible.	   	   Perhaps	   one	   of	   the	  most	   salient	   examples	   is	   from	  
Myrna	   Mack-­Chang	   v.	   Guatemala190,	   the	   case	   of	   the	   politically	  motivated	   extrajudicial	   execution	   of	   the	   well-­‐known	  anthropologist	  Myrna	  Mack.	  	  The	  order	  to	  investigate,	  prosecute	  
 
	   186.	   See	  CEJIL	  IMPLEMENTATION	  I,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  52-­‐55.	  
	   187.	   See	   Benavides	   Cevallos	   v.	   Ecuador,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	   Order	   of	   the	   Court,	   “Having	   Seen”	   (Inter-­‐Am.	   Ct.	   H.R.	   Nov.	   27,	  2003),	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/benavides_27_11_03_ing.pdf	  (finding	   that	   in	   1998,	   Ecuador	   declared	   that	   a	   statute	   of	   limitations	   was	  applicable	   to	   the	   criminal	   action	   against	   Mr.	   Fausto	   	   Morales-­‐Villacorta,	  convicted	  for	  the	  forced	  disappearance	  of	  Ms.	  Benavides).	  	   188.	   Bulacio	  v.	  Argentina,	  Monitoring	  Compliance	  with	   Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court,	  “Having	  Seen,”	  ¶	  13	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  26,	  2008),	  available	  at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/bulacio_26_11_08_ing1.pdf.	  
	   189.	   See	  id.	  ¶¶	  9–12.	  
	   190.	   See	   Myrna	   Mack-­‐Chang	   v.	   Guatemala,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   with	  Judgment,	  Order	  of	  the	  Court,	  “Having	  Seen”	  (Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  Nov.	  16,	  2009)	  [hereinafter	   Mack-­‐Chang,	   Monitoring	   Compliance	   2009],	   available	   at	  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/mack_16_11_09_ing.pdf.	  
	   	  
2012]	   STRATEGIZING	  FOR	  COMPLIANCE	   319	  and	   punish	   the	   perpetrator	   is	   the	   only	   outstanding	   element	   of	  the	   Court’s	   reparations	   decision;	   indeed,	   the	   state	   has	  satisfactorily	  complied	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  monetary,	  symbolic,	  legislative	   and	   administrative	   measures.191	   	   As	   early	   as	   2004,	  Juan	  Valencia	  Osorio,	  the	  man	  sentenced	  to	  30	  years	  in	  prison	  for	  the	   murder	   of	   Myrna	   Mack	   has	   been	   at	   large.192	   	   Important	  measures	   that	   have	   been	   taken	   are	   to	   solicit	   the	   support	   of	  INTERPOL,193	   and	   to	   convene	   an	   “Expediting	   Committee”	  composed	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Government,	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  and	  the	  Attorney	  for	   Human	   Rights	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   locating	   and	   arresting	  Osorio.194	   	   The	   state	   further	   indicated	   that	   it	   had	   set	   up	   fixed	  surveillance	   posts	   and	   dedicated	   two	   investigators	   to	   locating	  Osorio;	  nevertheless,	   the	   representatives	  observed	   that	  none	  of	  these	   actions	   have	   resulted	   in	   an	   arrest	   and	   raised	   serious	  questions	   about	   the	   government’s	   actual	   commitment	   to	   this	  goal.195	   	   While	   the	   representatives	   are	   right	   to	   denounce	   the	  compliance	  failure,	  the	  measures	  implemented	  by	  the	  state	  may	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  how	  to	  pursue	  such	  an	  arrest.	  	  	  Without	  a	  doubt,	  that	  only	  one	  out	  of	  57	  orders	  to	  investigate,	  prosecute,	   and	   punish	   perpetrators	   of	   human	   rights	   abuse	   has	  been	   fully	   implemented	   raises	   significant	   questions	   about	   the	  potential	   for	   inter-­‐American	   litigation	   to	   achieve	   this	   goal.	  	  However,	  when	  incremental	  successes	  are	  shared	  with	  the	  entire	  community	  of	  victims’	  representatives	  and	  failures	  are	  analyzed	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  weaknesses	  of	   justice	  systems	  and	  the	  targets	   for	   needed	   reform,	   compliance	   strategies	   can	   also	   feed	  into	   the	   larger	   movement	   to	   promote	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   	   The	  existing	   compliance	   jurisprudence	   provides	   insights	   and	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  that	  can	  help	  those	  committed	  to	  this	  endeavor,	  and	  it	   merits	   more	   emphasis	   by	   representatives	   in	   the	   inter-­‐American	  system.	   CONCLUSION	  Human	   rights	   litigation	   and	   advocacy	   at	   their	   best	   provide	   a	  creative,	   strategic	   and	   indefatigable	   force	   to	   compel	   states	   to	  fulfill	   their	   fundamental	   rights-­‐based	   responsibilities	   to	   those	  subject	  to	  their	  authority.	  	  The	  inter-­‐American	  system	  has	  played	  an	   important	   role	   in	   this	   regard,	   helping	   Latin	   America	   move	  beyond	   a	   troubling	   era	   of	   violent	   dictatorship,	   and	   providing	   a	  regional	  platform	  to	  debate	  core	  democratic	  values	  such	  as	  non-­‐discrimination,	  free	  expression,	  and	  access	  to	  justice.	  	  The	  Inter-­‐American	  Court,	  as	  the	  highest	  authority	  within	  that	  system,	  has	  been	  a	  beacon	  of	  hope	  for	  the	  marginalized	  and	  abused	  peoples	  of	   the	   Americas,	   and	   as	   an	   institution	   it	   has	   responded	   to	   this	  population	  by	  steadily	  increasing	  the	  prominence	  of	  the	  role	  for	  their	   representatives	   in	   Court	   proceedings.	   	   The	   historical	  decision	  in	  2001	  to	  create	  a	  private	  right	  of	  petition	  for	  victims’	  representatives,196	   followed	   by	   the	   2010	   reform	   making	   the	  representatives	   the	   principal	   actor	   in	   cases	   before	   the	   Court,	  creates	   an	   expectation	   that	   victims’	   voices	   will	   be	   heard.197	  	  Accordingly,	   there	   is	   an	   increased	   responsibility	   for	   victims’	  representatives	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   the	   participation	   of	   the	  intended	   beneficiaries	   of	   this	   litigation	   is	   meaningful,	   and	   that	  their	  voice	  is	  genuine.	  The	  compliance	  supervision	  procedures	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	   provide	   an	   important	   opportunity	   for	   victims’	  representatives	  to	  more	  faithfully	  counsel	  their	  clients	  about	  the	  likely	   results	   of	   litigation	   and	   to	   strategize	   more	   effectively	   to	  attain	  those	  results.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  intended	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  litigation	  can	  have	  a	  more	  meaningful	  role	  in	  the	  case	  that	  bears	  their	  name,	  and	  the	  legitimizing	  effect	  that	  they	  lend	  to	  the	  effort	  is	   of	   substance,	   rather	   than	   merely	   form.	   	   After	   all,	   the	   wide	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  range	   of	   reparations	   made	   available	   to	   litigants	   in	   the	   inter-­‐American	  system	  mean	  very	   little	   if	   they	  are	  not	  communicated	  to	  the	  people	  they	  are	  directed	  towards,	  and	  if	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  prioritize	  among	  them.	  	  With	  those	  priorities	  in	   place,	   and	   with	   informed	   likelihoods	   of	   success	   attached	   to	  each,	   the	   earnest	   advocacy	   endeavor	   that	   must	   accompany	   all	  human	   rights	   litigation	   finds	   its	   north.	   	   The	   compliance	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  Court	  should	  be	  a	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  all	  representatives	  in	  devising	  the	  creative	  strategies	  that	  will	  bring	  the	   victims	   of	   human	   rights	   abuse	   the	   reparation,	   recognition,	  and	  guarantee	  of	  non-­‐repetition	  that	  they	  so	  desire.	  
 
